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The "Polish Oorridor" was a derisive 
designation given by the Germana, to • certain 
portion or .ector of land. bordering on the 
Baltio Se. in Northern Europe. While 80me of 
the Oorridor lay on the east of the Viatula River, 
most of it was to the west of that main polish 
artery. It was ai tuated between pomerania on the 
weat, and Danzig and Eaat Pruaaia on the east. l 
!he Corridor waa wedge shaped, of varying Widths, 
2 but widest at its southernmost boundary. 
It was usual17 assumed that the Corridor 
compriaes approximately those parts of the former 
German provincea of Weat Prussia and posen 
3 
extending from Bomberg (Bydgoszos) to the Baltic. 
This region was a part of the German Empire up 
until the close of the World War. It embodied the 
efforts of the Peaoe Conference at Versailles to give 




Diison, WIllIam Sarbutt, Germanz under the Treatz. 
p. 102 
Ibid., p. 102 
atone, Shepard, "German polish Disputes," Foreist . 
policy Reporta, Vol. IX. No.9, p. 102, JUly S, 933 
Se,mour, Charles, The Intimate papers ~ Colonel 
Rouee, Vol. IV, p.-mrO 
r 
It is the purpose of this study to inquire 
into the history, the .otive for, the Justice and 
the expedienoy of this creation or allocation by 
the Peace Conference. 
!he reappearance of poland at the pariS Peace 
Conference in 1919 wss one of the most signifioant 
and unique events in our age. • nation whioh hal 
had a great and memorable past and whioh had under-
gone diasection in peace time at the hands of its 
greedy neighbors, came to life again, and was seeki., 
once more a looal habitation and a name. !hi. signi-
fied something more than the mere revival of a 
vaniahed state: It stood for the triumphant righting 
of one of the greatest politioal wrongs that Europe 
had ever witneBsed, the vindioation of the prinoiple. 
of Justice, right. and fair dealtng in international 
relations. l 
The Treaty of Versaille8 has been termed by 
2. 
some as C~aginian peace. 2 !he epithet, which implies 
injustice. or treachery. is misleadins. !he politioal 
map of Europe, as it has been drawn in the peace 
treaties, no doubt, compares favorably with the map 
1. Haekins, Charles Homer and Lord. Robert Howard, 
80me Problems of the Peace Conference, p. 163 
8. ~sil, Roman:-pO!ind, p. 9 
r 
which it replaoed and was more closely in aooord 
with the wishes of the populations conoerned than 
any previous arrangements of land areas in European 
history_ 
I. 
!he real objeotion to the !r8aties w,s not that 
they were un~ust. but that they were too impractioal 
and idealistio o the Western Slav, the universal 
bondsman of the early Middle Ages, is delivered fro. 
the !euton, the MUsoovite and the ~gyar.l Will the.e 
Slav states whioh have been oreated by the !reaties. 
establish themselves in the esteem and oonfidenoe of 
Burope, will they be eoonomioally sound uaits, and 
can they suooe.sfully resist the dangers which may 
prooeed from the valiant unreconoi1ed aristooraoies 
of prussia, Russia, and Austria? these questions. the 
futUre alone oan answer. 
Of 811 the new oreations by the peace treaties, 
poland was the most important, the most interesting, an' 
the most oontroversial. All through history the poles. 
like the Irish. haye been in the oenter of the strife: 
oombative. adventurous. temperamental, irrepressible. 
!heir annals have been marked by extreme vioissitudes 
of fortune; at one time they have been masters of a 
1. Dyb0 slti, Roman, QE.:. cit., p. 9 
r 
wide Empire stretohing from the Baltio to the Blaok 
1 8ea, at ~other time, partitioned and obliterated. 
If one of the requisites of a sOTereign state 
i8 a body of people oooupying a partioular territory 
,. 
and politioally organised under one government. poland 
was not a sovereign state When it appeared at Versaillea, 
for it was not organized potentially or aotualll under 
one gOTernment, nOr did it oocupy a definite territory. 
It was merely a phantom roaming around in the norther. 
plain8 someWhere between Germany and Russia; and what 
this disembodied spirit would look like if olothed 
2 
agaia in flesh and blood, no one aotually knew. 
It was, then, to be a part of the work of the 
Peaoe Conference to mark out and to determine ita 
boundariea. 
It may be illuminating at thi8 point to inquire 
into the manner of poland's extinotion as a nation in 
the eighteenth oentury, and to rehearse the .Tents 
and aotions that brought about its partition •• 
Attention might be fo.uaed on the fact that at 
the time of poland's exit from the family of nationa, 
the so oalled, "polish Corridor," was an undisputed 
part of polish territory. 
1. 
2. 
Dyboail, Roman, ~ cIt., pp. 9-10 
HaskiDs, Charlea~mer-and Lord, Robert Howard, 







The partitions of poland b;y its three close 
neighbors: Russia, Prussia, and Austria in 1772, 
1793, and 1796 have long been considered the 01a8si. 
example of inter~ational wrong and· crime in the 
eighteenth .entur;y. IO less a person than Thomas 
Jefferson, third President of the unite4 States, 
has denounoed the partitions of poland .s • wbaneful 
1 preoedent," a "crime," and an "atrooit;y.-
George Olemenoeau said that the partition of 
poland was the greatest orime in histor;y. also that 
it left an everlasting stigma on the names of 
Oatherine, )faria Theres., and 'rederiok II. 
wlo outrage had ever le8s exouse, no violence 
perpetrated against humanit;y ever oried loUder for 
6. 
a redress that had been indefinitel;y postpone4. The 
wrong was so great that no time in the life of Europe, 
among 80 man;y other acts of violenoe for whioh there 
was no expiation. could it appear les8 heinous. It 
,has beoome a byword in histor;y 88 one of the worst 




Basiiia, Charles Homer and Lord, RObert Howarl, 
~ Cit., p. 1M 
~mi:Diiau, George, Grandeur ~ M1serl ~ Victor" 
p. 193 
80me writers profeas to trace the idea of 
the p,rtition of poland back for more than a oenturr 
before it was an aooomplished faot. l Certainlr the 
idea waa not new. It had been discussed as earlr 8S 
1656 by Charles X of SWeden and the Great Eleotor, 
Frederick William; and for a oentury the idea hauntet 
the statesmen of many European oountries, emargins 
6. 
in the sinister half shadows of memoranda and projeot., 
oaly to be buried to a troubled rest. Whether 
'rederiok the Great was the first author of a definite 
soheme is disputable ant irrelevant and inoonsequential 
to the main development. 
!he seoond or third largest state in Europe with 
an area of 282,000 square miles. standing fourth in 
population with over 11,000,000 people, hat be .. 
destroyed. 2 Its frontier had extended from the Balti. 
Sea and the Carpathian Mountains to the Dneiper and 
the Dvina Bivera. It inoluded nearly the whole of that 
broad isthans between the Baltio S8a and the Blaok Sea 
whioh leads from Eastern Continental Europe to the 
3 peninsular Europe of the west. Nevertheless, it had 
been oompletely and totally obliterated from the map of 
1. lirrlott, 3. H. R. and RObertson, c. G •• !he 
Evolution of Prussia, pp. 151-52 ---
2. !emperiey.-a. I. V •• History of the Peace Conferenoe 
of paris. Vol. VI. p. 223 -- ---
3. Ibid., p. 223 
Europe by its great land grabbing and land hungry 
1 
neighbora. 
Certain observations of poland's historioal 
oatastrophe, namely the three partitions, easi17 
7. 
suggest themselvee to the outside observer indifferently 
convereant with general European histor7. 2 Thus, BO" 
bearings of Poland's geographical positio. on her fate 
are obvious enough. fhat position waa a "key" position 
at the crosBing of old established and important trade 
routee between the northern and southern seae, ant 
the western and eaetern lands of Europe. 3 1s suoh, it 
waa bound to make Poland a flourishing power in inter-
national trade in the Middle Ages; but it inevitably 
lost its advantages with the olosing up of Europea. 
south-east by the TUrkish conquest, and then the opening 
up of a neW world acroea the western seas for European 
trade; oommeroial wealth, and with it politioal power 
were fated to ebb away from Poland in the modern era 
qUite as easy as it was fated to ebb away from the 





Viewed from yet another angle, poland's fate seema 
Buell, Raymond LeSlie, lurope, p. 19' 
Dlboski, Roman, ~ Cit., p. 16 
Bowman, Isaiah, "!lii Bew World, p. 2'11 
femperley, H ••• -;;,-0;. Cit., Vol. VI, p. 219 
r 
8. 
to fall into line with certain wider developments 
in the Buropean world. Those who hold it a8 an 
established truth that since the Reformation Protestant 
powers in Europe generally advanced in strength an4 
importance, while Catholic nations deoaye4, may thiDk 
of the 014 poland as doomed together with Bpain, an4 
only affecte4 more tragioally than Spain itself, 
because much less favorably situate4 on the map. But 
even those who do not believe in Protestantism aa an 
elixir vital for nations, will be inolined to think 
that poland perished, among other reasons because ahe 
4i4 not make the best either of Protestantiaa or 
Catholicism. l 
poland stood aside in the great religious wars 
of the seventeenth century, then lapsed into a 
passivity Which made her a prey for foreign nationa. 
aer inactivity in the great wars of the eighteenth 
eentury and her consequent sufferings, were from that 
point of view but symptoms of vanishing prestige: 
irreaolute religious toleranoe was followed by the 
pacifism of paralyais. 
But surely Poland's attitude--whatever it waa--
OB the great religious issue of early modern timea 
was not in itself a suffioient cause for the overthrow 
1. Dyboail, Roman, Ope Cit., pp. 16-17 
of what was then a vast monarchy of great inter-
national power, rich resouroes, and a high degree 
of Gulture. 
9. 
Should we then, fin4 the aeed of poland's 
dissolution in the very process of her territorial 
growth? That growth indeed, has certain peculiarities 
which have an evident bearing on poland's extraordinary 
fate. 
An examination of the territorial growth of 
Poland and its later deoay, ahows that the impedimenta 
surrounding the oonstruction of the Polish-Lithuanian 
monarch7 on all side. were indeed too great to allow 
ita complete realization and continued aafe eXistenee. 
The rival power of the Hapsburg dynasty and SWeden, 
the unending preoccupation with the Diet, the extra-
ordinary growth of RuSSia, and finally, the German 
barrier on the Baltio, fixed sinoe the early Middle 
Ages, all these oombining, would have taxed the 
strength of a state much larger, rioher, and more 
firmly aettled in its internal conditions than the 
Poliah-Lithuanian empire ever became through the fQur 
centuries of its united eXistence. l 
We pass to a more intensive review of Polish 
history during the period of the partition •• 
1. D7boski, Boman, ~ cIt., p. 17 
r 
Prederick II was not on friendly terms with 
most of his neighbors. But he determined to oultivate 
the friendship of Catherine II of RUssia and he a180 
aided her in bringing to the vacant Polish throne her 
former lover. Stanislaus poniatowski. 
At Catherine's request, 'rederiok sent prussian 
troops into poland and shortly before the election of 
the Polish king. signed a treaty with catherine in 
whioh she secured all the advantages of the treaty 
for herself, 'rederiok promising to interfere i_ 
poland for the sake of purely RUssian interests. It 
was hinted however, that in oase of war he might hope 
for compensation. 
10. 
By a neW treaty with Russia, 1767. 'rederiok 
agreed that under certain oircumstanoes, he would throw 
an a~ into Austrian territory; but, in suoh a case, 
he fully 1ntended to compensate himself at the oost of 
poland. 1 
Irederiok reoogn1zed the danger of an Austro-Russian 
war in whioh Prus8ia must fight for RuSSia With doubtful 
prospects of compensation, the oertainty that cather1ne 
meant to abSOrb ~urkish territory. and that Joseph II 
of Austria and Xaunits, hi. min1ster, were determined to 
1. Henderson, Irne.t I., ! shOrt HIstory of Germanz, 
pp. 206-20' 
11. 
haTe compensation, to break up the Busso-prussian 
Alliance if possible, and 8ubstitute a BussO-.lustriUl 
undertSking in its place. Intrigue sharpened eTer7 
faculty of ~rederick's mind and in this great game of 
strategy and chicanery he had the more leTel head, the 
more experienced hand, and a definite and limited 
object - the acquisition of West prussia. 
He held right to his allianoe with Catherine and 
when Joseph of Austria in 1770 sei.ed the Polish 
district of Zips to satisfy an old claia, he flung 
his troops into Elbing. On January 28, 1772, the 
aecret treaty with Buasia riTeted catherine and Frederiek 
in an agreement to partition poland, and there waa 
nothing for Joseph to do but to fight Prussia and 
Bussia, Or join the agreement on the best terms he 
could malte. War, as Frederick h~d foraeen, waa 
uaneaeBeary if the three despots of eastern Europe 
would aggrandize themselTes at the expense of a defense-
less neighbor. 
By the treaty of February 19, 1772, Austria joined 
in, and after fiTe months spent in aettling details the 
Partition was an accomplished fact. 1 A previous 
ag~eement between Prussia and Bussia had been made in 
1. Lewinski-Corwin, Edgar H., ~ Political Historl !! -.P....,ol __ 8n __ d, p. 311 
r 
18. 
St. Petersburg on ~ebruary 6, 1778. Joseph aoquired 
Galicia and Lodomeri&, Catherine a large strip of 
Lithuania, and ~rederick, west Prussia, with pomerellen 
and Ermelaad, but without nansig or !hora. On 
September 13, the proclamation of annexation waa 
1 
made • 
• rederick II had been the chief instigator of 
the first partition. By this partition poland lost 
one-third of her territory. but the great fortresses 
of Danzig and Thorn, very much coveted by ~ederick. 
remained in the possession of poland. !hree years 
later (1775) the poles accepted a revised constitution 
Which, though m&king for more orderly and more economical 
administration. left poland entirely dependent upon 
Russia. But when in 1788 Russia became involvet in 
war both with ~urkey and SWeden, the anti-Russian party 
among the Poles led by _dam Cosimer csartoruski an4 
Ignatius potocki, seised the opportunity of electinc 
a Diet pledged to secure a liberal and independent 
con8titution for their unhappy country. !he Diet, 
which met at WarBaw in October, 1788, lasted four yeara. 
secured the withdrawal of Russian troops and entered 
into cordial relations with 'rederick William II of 
Prussia. The latter readily oonoluded an offenaive 
1. jarrIott, J. I. k. and Robertson, C. Grant. !!! 
Evolution !! Prussia, p. 162 
and defensive alliance with the Poles, and offered to 
recover for them Austrian Galicia, provided the7 
were willing to hand over Dansig and Thorn to him. 
But while they procrastinated, Prussia and Austria 
oame to terms at Reichenbach and Poland had lost its 
chanoe. Nevertheless, the Polish patriots made a 
desperate effort to put what remained of their house 
in order. 
In 1791 a new constitution inspired by British 
practioe and the French Revolution was adopted that 
gave prospects of making the country strong and 
~ite4. It represented a sinoere effort to convert 
13. 
the oountr,r into a oonstitutional monarch1. The 
electlve monarchy, the liberum veto, and the right of 
confederation were swept 8W87; the exeoutive was vested 
in a hereditary king, assisted by a responsible ministr7; 
there was to be a bi-camersl legislature, inoluding 
representatives of the cities; the osste system was 
abolished and a large installment of sooial reform was 
effected. l 
The adoption of this model oonstitution oame 8S a 
surprise to Europe. The neW constitution was an aot 
of defianoe to catherine, who was pledged to maintain 
1. Bue!i, Raymond Lesile, poland, p. 47 
----------------------------------~ .-.... -----~-
the anarchy enshrined in the Constitution ot 1775. 
fhe other partitioners t however, looked more kindly 
upon it. To Austria, a poland strengthened an4 
renovated would have been an undoubted advantage. 
'rederick William ot Prussia cordially congratulate' 
the Poles on the Constitution ot 1791. 
In 1792 the situation was again in several way_ 
more tavorable to RuSSia, not least by reason of 
the tact that the Austrians were involved in war 
with France. With Austria out of the tield, Russia 
no longer feared Prussia, cODSequently a small group 
of prO-Russian poles formed the Confederation of 
Targowica, denounced the new constitution 8S despotic, 
and demanded their ancient libertiea. When they 
appealed to catherine tor help, only too willingly 
Catherine complied. A Russian torce was sent into 
poland and before the end of June poland was once 
1 
more in the grip ot Bussia. 
14. 
The notable reforms devised in 1'91 were swept 
away. the old archaic oonstitution was restered, .. , 
Catherine, despite a strong protest from Austria, took 
toll fro. her Polish triends in the shape otsome 
98,000 square milea of territory and three million 
i. luell, laymond Lesile, Ope ~, p. IS-49 
15. 
people. Prussia, admitted to a share of the spoil, 
got Dansig and !horn with the provinces of Great 
poland, Gnesen, Kalisch, and Posen, including in all 
about a million and a half of people and 22,000 square miles 
of territory.l !he partitioners promised to use their 
good offioes to seoure the Bavarian exohange for 
Austria, a concession which did little to plesse the 
emperor. Austria, however, was deeply engaged in the 
west, and her protests against the second partition 
could therefore be safely disregarded. 
The Polish patriots did everything in their 
power to avert the loas of another part of their country, 
but they struggled in vain, and on September 23, 1793, 
the Diet at Grodno gave silent assent to the cession of 
Posen, DanZig, and Thorn to PrUSSia, and at the same 
time revoked all the proceedings of 1791 and entered 
into a formal alliance with Russia. 
As a crime against the prinoiples of nationality 
and independence the partition of 1793 was even worse 
than that of 1772. !he two really responsible 
partitioners, 'rederick of Prussia and Catherine of 
Russia, might in 1772 have sensibly pleaded that poland 
had shown herself inoapable of reform; that, as she 
1. Marriott, J. I. R. t and Robertson, C. Grant, 
~ Cit., p. 187 
r 
16. 
then stood, she was a perpetual menace to the aeeurit7 
of her neighbors and to the peace of Europe, and that 
Prussia and Russia were merely reoovering lands whioh 
in the past Poland had taken from them. 
But no similar plea oould avail to exouse the 
partition of 1793. The poles had manifested not mere17 
the desire but the ability to set their house in order. 
In the eyes of the partitioners the orime of the 
reformers of 1791 was that they did their work too 
well; that they might have given a new and vigorou. 
life to Poland and thus have interposed a fatal ani 
final barrier to the aggre8Bions of her powerful neigh-
bor •• l 
The Polish patriots did not aoquiesoe tamely i. 
the seoond dismemberment. After it had bee. oonsummated 
in 1793, the Russians were Virtually in militar7 
oooupation of what still remained of independent 
Polan4. 
In Maroh, 179., however, the Polish arm, rose under 
their former leader !adenas Kosoiusko. This valiant 
hero after the partition of 1793 had undertaken & ·mission 
to paris. He returned to poland, oalled upon hi. 
oountrymen to throw off the yoke of Russia and prussia, 
r. Karriott, J. I. R. and Robertson, c. Grant, 
~ ~, p. 188 
r 
and expelled the Russian garrison from Cracow, warsaw, 
and Vilna. 'or some months Kosciusko was practically 
master of poland; but his triumph was short lived. 
In M*y, 1'94. lrederick William placed himself at the 
head of a prussian ar~ and marched into poland. In 
JUne the prussians won a decisive victory at Rawka. 
!he Russians then inflicted a crushing defeat upon 
K08Ciusko. Kosciusko's defeat was soon fcllowed by 
the extinction of his countr,y. 
In January. 1'96, Catherine II came to a secret 
arrangement With the Emperor, to which Prussia was 
1'. 
to be subsequently invited to adhere. !he Russian 
frontier was advanced up to the river Bug, and an 
addition of territory Which brought with it about 
1,200,000 inhabitants was made. Austria obtained 
Cracow With the palatinates of sandomir and Lubelsk,-
with about 1,000,000 people. Prussia was to haTe warsaw 
with the district between the Oder. the Bug, and the 
Iiemen, but only on condition that she acquiesced in 
further accession of territory both to Russia and 
Austria at the expense of ~key. 
'rederick William was highly indignant, a8 well 
he might be at the treatment accorded to him by Ruesia. l 
i. Bueii, Raymond Lesile, Ope Cit., p. 51 
18. 
Aa things were he had no option but to aoquiesoe 
in the terms offered to hia, and so in 1795, Bew East 
Prussia was added to his dominions with another million 
of Polea, The partitioners thus destroyed the poliah 
State; they did not and could not, however, destroy 
or exterminate the Polish natio •• 
The partitioners' actions and espeoially 
'rederick's actions in the first partition have been 
defended; first, because poland was a d7ing kingdoa 
whioh the surgery of partition restored to a new life 
in the march of prussian civilization and progress; 
seoond, beoause the partitioners had taken baok 
territory whioh had onoe been their own and again, 
beoause the prussian aoquisitions were reolaimed 
with marvellous labor, and had conferred on it the 
blessings of an enlightened autooracy and an effioient 
administration; fourth, beoause if Yrederiok had not . 
interfered, Catherine and Joseph would have mad. *h. 
partitions, and Frederick would have obtained nothing; 
fifth, because the geographical, political, and 
military needs of prussia required that the gap between 
East Prussia and Prussian Pomerania should be filled 1n; 
and lastly, beoause without the annexation, prussia 
oould never have played the part in German and Europe .. 
----------~---~~~-~~-~-
history that she has subsequently played to the 
indisputable benefits of Germany, Europe, and 
1 heraelf. 
These arguments are simply illuminated angles 
19. 
and varianta of the oentral dootrine that ends justifJ 
means and that reason of state and law of dynastio 
needs baoked by bayoneta are superior to all other 
oonsiderationa. They would apply to and justify any 
and every aggressive oonquest. The partitions were 
B 
and remain a orime. 
This brings us to the oonaideration of the 
question of how far Poland's internal oonditions 
oontributed to the deoay of her politioal power and 
to her final undoing. It is on this great problem that 
the opinions of historians and scholars are most 
sharply divided, and stand out most glaringly against 
eaoh other. 
Foland had a fully developed parliamentary systea, 
while the monarohies which dismembered her were· more or 
le8s absolute. Hence the verdiot of some modernists 
that Poland's parliamentary institutions were too far 
advanoed for the age, and Foland perished as a martyr 
1. 
2. 
lirrlott, J. I. R. and RObertson, C. Grant, 
~~, pp. 152-53 
Il)ld.. p. 153 
-
r 
tor progressive ideas to be realized generally only 
in a somewhat later period. 
~his interpretation iB opposed to the older 
dootrine of the so-called "Craoow school" ot 
hiBtorians, a doctrine dominant in Polish scholarship 
. 
for a long time, and largely consonant with the views 
of foreign -- especially German -- students of Polisk 
hiBtory. 
According to thiB doctrine -- which had its 
20. 
origin in the depressed mood of the nation atter the 
tailure of the inaurreotion of 1863. poland teli from in-
ternal weakness and not from outside interference; had 
she deserved to live Burope would have prevented the 
partitions by some ooncerted effort; her past was only 
a sham greatness oovered with a tinsel ot glory that 
oo •• ealed the rotten core; there was no possible future 
tor such a nation. l ~he old poland brought her 
catastrophe upon herself through ill use made ot 
parliamentary liberties: freedom degenerating into 
lioense, the rights of the individual being unduly 
extolled and his duty to the state neglected, all 
attempts at administrative or social reform baffled 
by this arohaio individualism and by the clasa egoism 
of the nobility and gentry_ 
1. Humphrey, Grace, Poland the Unexplorel, pp. 320-21 
r 
poland perished throagh lack of a strong central 
government authority. and ensuing lack of enforcement 
in all matters vital to the life of the state --
Justioe, finanoe, military organization, and OOB-
1 
sistenoy in foreign policy. 
21. 
This fatalistic vie. which oertainly had a large 
body of facta in Polish history to support it. suffered 
from limitations proper to all suoh general theories; 
it often overlooked positive aOhievements, or mini-
mized their relative importanoe, whioh in some case. 
only beoame apparent in our own da78. 
!o combine a great measure of popular liberty 
with the necessary strength of central state authority 
seems tOday next to impos8ible. Yet this was the 
task which Poland faced at the time when her terri-
torial growth and international prestige were at their 
height, and her political and moral responsibilities 
accordingly the gravest and the greatest. 
'Ie have examined now in a brief survey, the 
possible causeS of old Poland's decay and fall and 
aOml explanations of her ~sterious survival after 
political death, and we arrive at the deep truth. that 
the foroea of the spirit are the true sources of life. 
1. DYboail, lOmBa, ~ CIt., pp. 24-25 
-- ---- ----~.~~-
NeYer extinguished in the 80cial organism of poland, 
and more active than ever in the last stage. of her 
material decay, they were to tide that nation acrosa 
the dark abyss of captivity and subjection into a 
renewed fullness of existenoe in a later period. 
81. 
CHAPfER II 




FROM THE PARTITIONS TO THE PEACE COIFERENCE 
fhe century and more ot poland's division between 
her three neighboring empires and of the government of 
the nation by foreign rulers might at present, with 
poland reunited and tree, appear to be but a dark 
interTSl which it would be best to pass unnoticed in 
surveying the history of Poland with regard to it. 
bearings on the present. 
yet the century during which modern poland wa. 
deprived of unity and freedom, was no other than the 
great nineteenth century, the era of the growth of 
democracy, of gigantic achievements in science and 
technology. of the awakening of nations long submerged 
in darkness and tyranny. and of the development. in 
Empire-building, and in international trade which 
led up to the greatest convulSion and revolution in 
recorded history. 
The record of the nineteenth century poland was 
one of oeaseles8, untiring, and active resistance to 
foreign domination by every possible means and on 
every ocoasion which the course of international affaire 
aeemed to offer. Hence the reputation which the Pole. 
in the nineteenth century acquired allover Europe of 
• 
r 
being the most persistent and the most romantio 
1 
military adventurers in the world. Thu8, for twenty 
years they followed Bapoleon's eagles and shed their 
blood on all his battle fields in the unflagging hope 
that out of his drastic rearrangement of the map ot 
Europe a neW and complete Poland would ultimatel, 
arise, and the spirit of those years did bear fruit 
again and again. 
Wherever a nation struggled for liberty, Polish 
knights-errant were sure to be found aD its front 
ranks. 
In the nineteenth aentury, the partial and half-
hearted concessions by which the partitioning powers 
at various times met the insatiable desire of the 
poles for complete political freedom did not hinder 
the nation, through two-thirds of the nineteenth 
century, from rising in rebellion again and again. 
~o insurrectionary wars against RuSSia, in 
1830-31 and 1863-64, each taxed Russia's huge military 
strength to the utmost; and the "springtime of nations" 
in 1848, sweeping the Whole of Europe with gusts of 
revolutionary movements, had its stor~ reverberations 
both in the Austrian and the German division of poland. 
1. Dyboskl, Roman, ~ CIt., p. sa 
r 
If, howeTer. the cause of poland failed to 
reoeiTe actiTe support trom Western European Powers 
at oritical and crucial moments, the riSings. 
neTertheless, achieTed one end: They kept the poliah 
iasue alive in Burope's international politica, ant 
did not allow it to aink to the insignificanoe of • 
merely looal and provinoial matter. 
poland's greatest poet, Adam Miokiewios. writ ins 
for the comfort and pleasure of his fellow exiles i. 
paris a book of parablea, admonitions. and propheoies 
in Biblical prose, oalled!!! BoOks!! !!! _po~l_i_s_h 
lation!!! ~!!! Polish PilgrimsI' (1833). had ended 
it with a Pilgrims' Litany oontaining a prayer to 
Go4, "for a great war whioh would bring deliveranoe 
26. 
1 to oppressed nations." And, indeed. as the nineteenth 
oentury was draWing towards its oloae, it seemed that 
little Short of the terrible fulfillment of Mickiewioa' 
inspired prayer could bring the Polish oause baok to 
life. forty years after Poland's last armed riSing, 
the poliah problem, as an issue of international 
politics. seemed thoroughly dead and burie4. 
France, Which had often manifesteel a sympathetic 
and friendly interest in Polish national aspirations, 
1. Dybo8kl, Roman. OPe ~, p. 70 
r 
now, after her defeat of 1870-71, had sought 
security in an allianoe with Tsarist Russia, which 
implied the tacit abandonment of the largest seotion 
of Poland to Russian oppressio.. Austria, which 
for cogent reasons had allowed self-government to ita 
Poles, was drifting into greater dependenoe on her 
powerful German ally. Germany, herself, was .a 
determined as ever to suppress Polish nationality 
within her bordera. Her endeavors in that respect 
went exaotly parallel to Russia'S and it seemed that 
whatever other differences might arise between them, 
Berlin and st. petereburgh would always eee alike on 
the question of poland. 
In poland itself, not only had the interests of 
the three divisions of the oountry oome to diverge 
widely fro. eaoh other, but the generation groWing up 
sinoe the last armed struggle of 1868, had beoome too 
absorbed in the pursuit of the material ends of 
modern economio effort to retain a vivid sense of 
the reality of national aims. 
26. 
The land-owning gentry. which had been the backbone 
of reSistance to foreign rule in previous uprisings, 
now profes8ed aoquiesoenoe, and actually evolved a 
politioal programme of reoonoiliation and threefold 
r 
l07altr,even under Prussia, where it was engaged 
in a struggle for the land, that class never thought 
of any but legal weapons in the oontest. 
fhe manufaoturing and oommeroial oommunities 
in all three seotion8, but partioularly under Russia, 
had exoellent reasons to oling to the oonneotion With 
large imperial organism8. 
!he peasantry, for the most part national17 
unawakened, always essentially oonserTative, and now 
bent with might and main upon the aoquisition of more 
and more land, naturally oould not be expeote, to 
pur8ue what 8eemed the ohimera of national reunion 
and freedom. 
27. 
Under the oiroumstanoes it was only the professional 
intelligentsia of the towns -- that 01as8 of determinins 
importanoe for all spiritual movements in latter-day 
oontinental Europe whioh kept the torch of national 
aspirations burning. 1 
In 8pite of all preparatory aotivitie8, the 
declaration of war in August, 1914, opened up for the 
poles a gloo~ and agonising prospect. !hey saw 
themBelves herded together in the ranks of the German, 
Austrian, and Russian armies, about to be hurled againat 
1. Dibosii, Roman, .Qh CIt., p. '1 
28. 
eaoh other in fratricidal strife, brother pitted 
against brother, and both against their mother oountry. 
Four years of varied horrors followed. Four years of 
invasions and counter~invasion8. of armies moving baok 
and forth and systematioally ravaging or robbing 8a 
they moved; four years of terrible isolation from .11 
friend8 and four years of ignorance of what was gOiDi 
on in the outside world. 
What hope was there for the Poles in such a war? 
What oould they see but continued subjeotion to others? 
If the Central powers should win, Russia might be 
compelled to give up her Polea, but who would get them, 
if not the Austrians and the Germans? If Austria ani 
Germany should lose, would not the outcome be merely 
the reverse. subjectioa to RU8sia instead of to 
Austria and Germany? 
To be 8ure, throughout the war, the one side or 
the other tried. a8 its fortune. waned or waxed for the 
moment, to lure the Pole8 to hearty oooper~tion against 
its enemie8 by promising them a restored and united 
Poland in the end, but these promises were alway. 
vague and fleeting, always qualified by some ambiguity 
or reservation that rendered them nUll. Or nearly so, 
in the eye. of the Poles whose experience in the past 
r 
with the triple bank of oppressors did not lead the. 
to repose an unlimited confidence in them now. 
29. 
But unanimous a8 was the opinion of the publio 
generally regarding the justice of the polish cauee 
among statesmen and politicians. the idea was scarcely 
les8 general that from a practical standpoint the cause 
was hopeless. The only hope for the Poles in the 
great war was that both side •• Russia on the one hand. 
and Germany and Austria on the other, should come out 
of it '.feated. But such a hope could not be 
reasonably entertained, so preposterous it eeemed • 
• eTerthelesa. the preposterous happened. 
Russia wae defeated by the Oentral Powers and 
was compelled to sign the treaty of Brest-Lito.sk. 
The Oentral Powers were defeated by the Allies and 
oompelled to sign the Versailles and other treaties. 
The ground was oleared for a new struoture, and one 
more substantial and more comfortable for its oocupant. 
than that whose unoertain and shadowy plan had, durine 
the war, been dangled before them at Tarious timea by 
their oppressors. 
It W8S, howeTer, the Russian ReTOlution which was 
to exercise a deoisiTe influence on the oounsels of 
the Allies and on the destinies of poland. It did so 
eTen in its first stage, while it still seemed that 
ohanges would be moderate and Russia would hold out 
80. 
in the ranks of the Allies. !he ProTisional GOTernment 
of the reTo1utionary period issued on Karoh 30, 1917. 
a manifesto to the Polish nation, recognising its right 
to politioal iDdependence. l Although thi. oontained 
an allusion to some sort of union between the new 
poland and Bussia, it was justly hailed by Polish 
opinion as a highly important and further step in the 
direotion of deliveranoe.! A beginning bad been made 
by Russia her~elf With. thorough readjustment of ag.-
old relations established by oonquest. 
ETen before the manifesto of revolutionary . 
Russia. the voioe of Amerioa, a power still neutral 
at that time. but soon to be a determining faotor 
in the European struggle,~8d rung out olearly on the 
subject of Poland. President Wilson, in a measage 
to Congress foreshadowing Amerioa's .possible share 
in the conolusion of the peaoe, had deolared that a 
reunited and free Poland was one of the war aims admitted 
Oil all 8ides.3 
It was also before the Bussian manifesto that 
1. Dybosi!, Roman, ~ ~, p. 76 
2. 'isher, H. H., Amerioa and the New poland, p. 96 
8. George, David Lloyd, ieiitrs of~e Peaoe Conferenoe, 
p.630 --
K. Dmowski had submitted to Balfour a memoir 
embodying his own and his fellow workers' ideas 
31. 
on the territorial composition of a reconstructed 
Polish State -- ideas which essentially remained his 
programme when he afterwards represented poland at 
the Peace Conference. 
It was, on the other hand, under the encouraging 
impression produoed by President Wilson's utterances 
and by revolutionary Russia's ·recognition of Polish 
claims that the Austrian Poles on their part, now 
ventured to state national aima more frankly than 
had ever been done before in the Central Empire. A 
. resolution passed by the Austro-Polish parliamentary 
Deputies assembled at Cracow in May 1917, expressly 
defined a complete and independent Poland as the goal 
of national aspirations. It was also in this resolution 
that Austria was for the first time treated by her 
Polish subjects not 8S a proteoting Power, but as an 
Ally, whose servioes were only welcome if helpful for 
the attainment of the clearly defined national aims. 
fhat such an unprecedented note should have been 
struck, was rendered possible not only by the turn 
which affairs had taken in Russia, but also by a recent 
happening unler the Austro-German occupation. The 
r 
question of drawing upon the occupied territory 
of former Russian poland for recruits was becoming 
an acute one for the Central Powers. It waa 
32. 
cautiously proposed to widen the framework of 
Pileudski's Legions (Poles organized by Joseph 
Pilsudski to aid Austria) so as to create a larger 
Polish armed force which, however, would at the same 
time be more unreservedly at the disposal of the 
Central Powers for their war aims. 
Pilsudski, at this critical pOint, parted compsn, 
with the Central Powers to whom he had always pro-
feased only conditional allegiance. He forbade hie 
loyal followers to take the new military oath 
required of them and refused it himself. His faith-
ful legionaries were disbanded and interned and he 
himself imprisoned in the fortress of Magdeburg. 
fhis imprisonment added considerably to his prestige 
in the eyes of the nation; it raiaed him to the 
dignity of a symbol of national resistance to foreign 
rule. 1 
France now at last saw her way to authorize and 
aSSist the formation of a Polish ar., for the Allied 
aide, and shortly before the close of the War on 
1. risher, H. H., ~ Cit., p. 100 
r 
Jul7 I, 1918, poland was raised b7 a decision ot 
the Allied statesmen at Verssilles to the raak ot 
a belligerent Allied nation. The Polish .ational 
Committee in paris was thereb7 recognized in the 
Allied camp as an official representation of the 
polish people. 
While the War 7et raged, long before the Peace 
Conference opened, the problem of Poland had been 
envisaged from a ve~ different angle by the Allies 
. 
to that of the partitioning Powera. 
As early as Ma" 1917, as we ha~e observed, 
the attitude of the Poles themselves was defined 
b, the Polish members of the Austrian parliament 
who declared that "the desire of the Polish natio. 
was to have restored an independent and united poland 
with access to the sea."l 
aore important, because it had more foroe 
behind it, was the opinion of the Entente powers, 
who.e tim1dit7 i. this matter, as in man, others, 
had been pronounced but was now beginning to cata~ 
up with the posSibilities and requirements of the 
situation. Russia'S western Allies bad &1ways 
observed diplomatic silence on the Polish qUestion, 




and censored all unofficial allusions to it. In 
1910, Italy was the first among the Allied Powers 
1 
to raise its Toice in behalf of the tree Polan'_ 
On November 16, 1916, the Clar of all Russia 
himaelf, announced his intention of establishing 
pol8.Ild, including RU8sian poland, Galicia and pos-
nania, as an autonomous and united kingdoa Withi. 
the RussIan Empire. 
On January 6, 1918, David Lloyd George, statine 
that he was speaking "for the nation and Empire &S 
a Whole," declared that "an independent poland, 
comprising all those genuinely Polish elements who 
deSire to for.. part ot it, is an urgent neoessity for 
the stability of Weatern Europe."2 
»ut, perhaps, the best and clearest statement 
ot the aspirations and determination of the Allied 
and ASSOciated nations at war was giTen by Woodrow 
Wilson in an address to a joint sesBion of Congress 
on January 8, 1918. In this discourse, the President 
enunciated his famous "fourt.en Points." !he 
thirteenth point stated that, "An independent polish 
state Should be erected whioh should inolude the 
territories inhabited by indisputably Polish 
1. 
2. 
'lsher. !. H., ~ Cit •• p. 96 
George, DaTid LlO;Jd, Op. ~, Vol. II. p. 630 
r 
populationa, which should be assured a free and 
seoure access to the sea. and whose politioal and 
eoonomic and territorial integrity should be 
guaranteed by international covenant.·l Several 
times throughout the year of 1918, president Wi180R 
reiterated in one form or another the main view8 
expressed in this prograa. 
36. 
In the two months between the middle of September 
and the middle of November, 1918, the two Empirea whioh. 
sinoe 1916. had held all the Polish lands, toppled in 
defeat and revolution. 
!he events and negotiations whioh Signaled the 
defeat of the Central powers and their recognition 
of Polish independence may now be briefly enumerated. 
On September 16. 1918, the Government of the Dual 
MOnarchy asked the president of the Unite~ state. for 
a statement of terms of peaoe. On Ootober " the newlJ 
apPOinted German Imperial Chanoellor. prince MaX of 
Baden. proposed the conolu8ion of a general aratstice. 
In his note, prinoe Max requested the president of the 
united states to take steps relative to the restoration 
of peaoe, to notify all belligerents of the request, 
and to invite the. to delegate plenipotentiaries for 
1. Seymour. Charles. ~ ~. Vol. IV, p. 200 
r 
the purpose of taking up negotiation •• 
!he note further stated that the German Govern-
ment accepted as a basis for the peace negotiations. 
the program laid down by the President of the United 
states in his me a sage to Congress of January 8, 1918. 
and in his subsequent pronouncement •• particularly 
in his address of September 87. 1918. In order to 
avoid further bloodshed, the German Government 
requested the President to bring about the immediate 
oonolusion of a general armistioe on land. on water, 
1 
and in the air. 
The note also stated that the German Government 
86. 
believed that the governments of the powers assooiate4 
with the United States likewise aooepted the position 
taken by President Wilson in his address. 
We may thus observe that Germany and Austria 
Hungary agreed to the resurreotion o~ the independent 
poland With a free and seoure accesa to the se., in 
her preliminary negotiations for an armistice. 
The Pole a interpreted theae requests for an 
armistice on Wilson'S terms as recognition of their 
independence and proceeded to set up their own 
temporary government in the place of those of the 
1. rIsher, ft. H., OPe Cit., p. 114 
Central Powers. 
On Ootober a, the Regency Council at wars •• 
issued a manifesto dissolVing the Council of state 
that bad been elected under German auspicea and 
prepared to aummon a popularly eleoted diet 88 the 
Constitutional Assembly. About the same time the 
authority which the Central powera had exercised 
aince 1915 in the Congreas Kingdom was relinquished. 
On November 3, 1918 at Warsaw, poland waa 
declared a Republio. No improvised government set 
8'. 
up in poland was recognised by the Allies, but in 
pariS, the Polish ~ational Committee, which oontrolled 
no polish territory, en30yed Allied recognition as the 
1 
representatives of the polish nation. 
Yortunately for poland the German revolution 
released from the fortress of ~gdeburg the man who 
through the exigencies of the war had become the most 
popular leader of the soldiers and the Dasses of the 
people. Joseph Pilsudski arrived in warsaw on 
Bovember 10, and his arrival marked the beginning of 
a centralization of authority_ On the day of Pi1sudBki'a 
arrival in warsaw the Regenoy Counoil solemnly declared 
the German ocoupation at an end. 
1. riaher, fi. H., ~ Cit., pp. 116-1' 
r 
On the day the Armistioe was signed Polish 
offioials took OTer the exeoutiTe functions in 
Warsaw, and the Regenoy Counoil placed the supre .. 
military authority in the hands of Pilsudski. The 
Regenoy Counoil did not long surTiTe the German 
authority whioh had oreated it, and on NOTember 1'. 
it submitted to popular demand and resigned. The 
Comma.nder in Chief 0 f the .lrI07 beoame Chief of the 
polish state. 
By this time the Poles were diTided into two 
groups of almoat equal strength, neither of Whioh was 
willing to submit to the other, nor strong eaough to 
foroe its will on the nation. The Polish National 
Committee in paris, was headed by K. Dmow8ki and 
dominated by the Bational Demoorats. This co~ttee 
oontrolled the polish Army in Yranoe, now oommanded 
by Haller. and it also enJoyed the oonfidenoe of the 
Great powers Whoae representatiTea were gathering i. 
paris to redraw the frontiers of Europe. 
88. 
On the other side, PilsudSki, the hero of the 
ma8se8 was installed in Warsaw. His personal prestige 
with the masses was greater than that of any leader 
on the other side and at hi8 baok was an armJ rapidl, 
growing in nUDbers and organization and intensely loyal 
to hi.. But Pilaud8ki
'
S position was weak where that 
r 
of hiB rivals was strong. His service in the foroes 
of the Central powere had not been forgotten by the 
Allie8 and more damaging, perhaps at this time, were 
hiB sooialist opinions and his long revolutionarJ 
oareer. Bolshevism had suoceeded ~eutonism as the 
great bogey of Western opinion, and Bolshevism was 
39 
an inolusive term making Sooialists of all oomplexions 
suspects. 
Joreign rule had been broken, but poland was still 
divided. Division meant weakness; union, strength. 
lJe8k.ness and division were not the right kind of wares 
to display before the all-powerful Allies, who were 
then assembling at paris to fashion among other things 
a new Polish world. ~o escape disaster, and to profit 
by the independenoe won at such cost a8 roland had 
paid, it W8.S necessary and imperative for the poles to 
patch up a political unity which would make it pos8ible 
to utilize the prestige and ability of Pilsudski in 
poland and of Dmowski e·nd padereYski in pari s. Under 
these circumstanoes, a compromise wee made by which 
the Moraozewski Ce.binet resigned and paderewski became 
premier and Joreign Minister on uanuary 16. 1919. with 
a cabinet representing the different parties and also 
the different divisions. 
paderewski's assumption of Premiership is B 
r 
landmark in the history and restoration of poland. 
!he new state was able to present a united front at 
the Peace Conference, Which had its first sesaioa 
in paris two days after the neW cabinet assumed 
office, and was represented by her Prime Minister .-
one of the most notable and influential personalitiea 




THE PEACE CONFERENCE 
CHAPTER III 
THE PEACE CONFERENCE 
The Treaties of paris oonstitute the greatest 
measure of national liberation of subject nations 
ever aohieved by any war settlement on reoord. The 
Peace settlement meant the bringing of freedom to 
many million of Poles. It waa by no means a simple 
task to determine the borders of the neW state. The 
diffioulty of applying the idea of nationality was 
inoreased because the boundaries of "historio Poland" 
fluotuated from generation to generation and often 
inoluded large areas where the population was not 
polish by raoe and language. 
The Peaoe Conferenoe summoned the representatives 
of poland before it on January 18, 1919, and by so 
doing formally reoognised the neW Polish 8tate. 
poland was given two votes in the Conferenoe. polan' 
was represented by K. Dmowski and I. J. paderewski 
with CaSimir Dlusk1, a Pilsudski appOintee 8S an 
alternate. 
Kpwever. the reoognition of the Polish state di4 
not determine the very important matter of what 
territory the neW state was to oontain. Theae 
memories of 8 Greater poland were destined to give 
, . 
trouble to those who sought to settle national 
boundaries on ethnological and tradit10nal prin-
ciples. When the Poles presented their olaims to 
the Conference. the1r claims were by every canon 
of self-determination extravagant and inadmissable. 
M. Dmowski's conceptions of the reconstruotion 
42. 
of poland were known to the Allies trom his memorandum 
addressed to :Balfour in 191'1. True to his pre-war 
view that Germany was the most dangerous enemy of 
poland. Dmowski 1a1d stress on a maximum of terri-
tor1a1 acquisitions on the western side of poland. 
wh1ch would insure poland's economic and strategical 
independence as against GermSD7.1 Not content 
accordingly with the recovery of the province of 
the poenania. lost through the partitions, he desired 
to see Poland's historical access to the sea by 
Danzig safegnarded through the poesession of a wide 
stretch of territory on both banks of the lower 
Vis tula , including if pOSSible, poland's Bometime 
Tassal state, the province of East Prussia. 
He wished to see Poland's economic development 
in the direction of industrialization placed on a 
firm basis by the incorporation of 8ileeia. which 
1. :Bue1i, Raymond Leslie, ~ ~t p. 63 
- --~- --- - - ~~- ---- - - - ~~~~~~~ 
had been separated from poland sinoe the fourteenth 
oentury, and inoluded in prussia sinoe the middle 
.. 1 
of the eighteenth oentury. On the eastern side, 
on the other hand, he was prepared to saorifioe • 
large portion of the borderland pos.essions inoluded 
in poland before the partitions partly beoause they 
were inhabited by non-Polish population whioh had 
sinoe reaohed a troublesome degree of national 
oonsoiousness of their own, and partly also beoause 
he Wished to leave the door open for a future 
understanding with RUssia. 2 
K. Dmowsk1'. Views in this, as on most other 
pOints, were fundamentally different from those of 
Joseph Pilsudsk1's and his politioal allies who 
oontinued to see in Russia the prinoipal danger to 
poland's existence. 
Pilsudski inherited with the blood of the 
eastern borderland gentry from whioh he bad sprung, 
a vivid sense of the great historical tradition of 
poland's imperial union with her eastern neighbor, 
Lithuania, and of poland's oivilizing mission in the 
Lithuanian and Ruthenian border countriea. Hia 
l. 
2. 
!emperley, H. W. V., ~ cit •• p. 221 
Dyboski, Roman, 2E.:. £lli. p. 83 
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programme was, accordingly, more extensive and 
ambitious on the eastern than on the western 
aide. Pilaudski imagined the eastern borderlands 
constituting a series of small buffer statea 
between Russia and poland, which would be a 
superior civilization if Poland gradually CoUld 
be drawn into some sort of federative union with 
them. 
On the western side he would have remained 
satisfied with the restitution of her Polish-German 
frontier as it existed before the first partition in 
1772.1 If, now, we compare the settlement actually 
effected by the Peaoe Treaties with these two 
different Polish conceptions of it, we observe that 
the solution given to the Polish problem by the 
peacemakers of Versailles waa, like their solution 
of many other European questions, necesaarily 
somewhat hasty and accordingly unaatisfactory. 
On January 29, 1919, M. Dmowski presented the 
territorial claims of poland. In settling the 
boundaries of Poland, he said poland would not be 
aatisfied With the historical boundaries ot 1772 in 
the West. 'or example, Silesia had been lost to 
1. Dybosii, Roman, Op. ~t p. 83 
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Poland since the fourteenth oentury, but toda, 
ninety per oent of the population, owing to the 
national revival, had kept its language and was 
strongly Polish. He re~rked that the whole 
territory of Eastern Germany was not naturally 
German but was Germanised. He quoted Bulow 8S 
saying that what Germany had lost in the west in 
the breaking up of Charlemagne's empire, she had 
gained in the east. Summing up the question of 
what is, or what is not, Polish territory, he 
suggested that a rough definition would be that 
such territory a8 had been oppressed by Anti-
1 Polish laws was Polish territory. 
He went on· to say that if the ooast belonged 
to one nation and the land to another, there would 
be mutual tendencies to conquest, and quoted Herr 
Bebel as saying that Germany's task waa not to 
colonize Afrioa, but to colonize the Vistula region. 
He maintained that it would be more just to expose 
a small Germani.ed country to infiltration by Poles, 
than to deprive all P?land of economic independenoe 
and to expose it to German aggression. 
The Conference at paris manifested so far 8S 
1. George, David Lloyd, ~~. p. 632 
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the boundary between Germany and poland was oon-
cerned two main tendenoies in the discussions 
aooording to its official historian. 
The first tendency was based on the idea 
that friends should be strengthened at the expense 
of enemies. and that the innocent should be 
strengthened at the expense of the guilty. It 
showed a leaning in all doubtful cases to give 
the benefit of the doubt to poland. 
!he seoond tendency rested on the principle 
of doing justice to enemies 88 well 88 friends. 
On the whole. the seoond tendenoy in most instances 
prevailed, Mr. Temperley maintains, and especially 
so in dealing with Danzig and the Polish Corridor. l 
So far as the frontiers with Germany were concerned. 
strategic considerations were for the most part 
oompletely ignored. 
46. 
It may be added that in regard to regions whioh 
had been taken away from poland by great international 
wrong and crime and Germanized by unique and shamefully 
political methOds, it was neither unreasonable nor 
unjust to give poland the benefit of the doubt in 
1. Temper1ey, H. w. v •• .2l?:. .Q.!i.:.. p. 241 
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oases where doubt really eXisted. 
In the attempt to secure justice as between 
nation and nation, it was agreed that nationality 
must be the chief basis of settlement. It was 
equally agreed that economic factors might over-
ride the faotor of nationality. History was not 
and oould not be ignored altogether. Religion waa 
taken into acoount, but mainly in a negative way. 
The Poles demanded that the ethnographic criterion 
ahould be the determining factor, and that where it 
was necessary to modify the ethnographic frontier 
because of economic, historical, or other considera-
tiona that modification should be to the advantage 
1 
of Poland. They interpreted the ethnographic 
frontier strictly as inoluding all regions in which 
Poles by race and language were in & majority, and 
they were inclined to assume that Polish race and 
language implied ~n all cases a Wish to be united to 
the new Polish state. 
In addition they went considerably further than 
the Entente powers in their desire to modify the 
ethnographic frontier to their own advantage for 
I. 'emperIey, H. w. v., ~ Cit., p. 236 
47. 
eoonomio and other reasons. 
Perhaps in oertain oases they asked for more 
then they really expected to reoeive and sometimes 
damaged their position by asking too muoh. 
~he deoisions lay with the Peaoe Conferenoe as 
a whole, but primarily with the prinoipal ~llied and 
Assooiated Powers, the United states, ~ranoe. Italy. 
Japan, and Great Britain. ~he deoisions were in all 
eases unanimous. 
On the oentral point all the Powers were agree4 
that it was necessary to establish a polish state and 
with it a real ohance of existenoe, that is a state 
with the greatest possible stability and strength. 
Opinions differed only in the manner in whioh poland 
oould be made most strong and most stable. 
!he ~renoh aim at the Peace Conferenoe was a 
peaoe of seourity. France was consoious of a German 
menaoe whioh threatened both her and poland alike. 
She was not, howeyer, unoonsoious of the diffioulties 
involved nOr did she wish to go as far as the poles 
themselvea. l 
!he CommiSSion whioh the Conferenoe apPOinted On 
polish affaire, headed by M. Jules cambon, a Frenohman, 
I. femperley, H. w. V., ~ CIt., p. 238 
leaned strongly toward the Franoo-polish view on 
disputed pOints. In the report Which it submitted 
to the Supreme Counoil toward the end of Karoh, it 
feoommended that Poland be given the greater part 
of Posen and Upper SileBia, a broad corridor to the 
Bea along both banks of the Vistula River, and the 
city of Danzig. 
It was indioated in the first report of the 
Cambon OomDdssion that the drawing of a frontier 
line on 8 purely ethnological basis was almost an 
insuperable difficulty. Economic and strategio 
requirements had also to be taken into account in 
drawing boundaries in order that the new state thus 
delimited should have a fair chance of surviving. 
The real cause of the death of Poland. s&i4 
K. cambon. was not merely its faulty political 
organization, but principally its lack of communi-
oation with the sea. The real end of poland did not 
oome in 1772, but in 1743, When Danzig was lost. l 
Without that port Poland oould not live. By it alone 
oould Poland have aooess to liberal powers in the 
west. It was no use setting up a poland deprived of 
access to.the sea, as it would inevitably be the 
1. George, David Lloyd, ~ Cit., p. 639 
prey of Germany or of a reoonstituted Russia. 
poland must have not only a sea-board, but also 
full and free oommunication with Danzig. If he 
had to choose between protecting German popula-
tions largely imported Since the eighteenth oentur.J. 
and protecting Poles, he unquestionably preferred 
the latter alternative. 
fhe Amerioan aim at the Peace Conference, aa 
was Shaped by her President and voioed in his 
public addresses w~s for a peace of final world 
conciliation. He held up the banner of the ideal. 
President Wilson was enthusiastically pro-
Polish. In the Peace Conferenoe he sympathized 
strongly with Polish aspirations. But he told Ray 
stannard Baker on April 7 that, "the only real 
interest of France in Poland is in weakening Germany 
by giving Poland territory to whioh she has no 
right."l 
American delegates had displayed very early 
marked interest in the matter of PoliSh independence, 
and. like France, had historio tieS with poland. As 
regards the frontier With Germany, the ~ric8ns 
1. Baker. Ray Stannard, 'ooAro. tl1son and World 




were, like the British, oonsoious of the halard 
of including too many Germans in poland. 
In the later stages of the negotiations, the 
Americans displayed more reluctanoe before acoeptiag 
further modifioations introduced by the British. 
The British aim lay somewhere between the other two, 
a practioal peaoe combining conciliation and seourity, 
punishing Germany without orushing her, improTlng the 
world, but not seeking all at once to aohieve the 
1 
millennium. 
The British were most consciOUS of the i.-
expedienoy of inoluding large numbers of Germans 
within the polish frontiers and were the prime movers 
in the direotion of diminishing the number of Germane 
in the neW Polish nation. 2 
Lloyd George was against poland annexing a oity 
of Germans -- against it also for the sake of poland. 
"We must set up a Poland that can live," he said. "If 
awollen by enemy populations she will explode from 
within, Danlig is outside the real orbit of poland, 
make it international." President Wilson supported 
51. 
him; M. Clemenceau was persuaded; and Mr. Lloyd George 
i. 8pender, Haroid, The Prime DInlster, p. 29i 
2. !emperley, H. W. V. t ~~, p. 239 
r 
1 
got his way. 
Mr. Lloyd George wished poland to flourish 
&s a self-governing state, but not to enter on its 
existenoe by inflioting on others the crime of the 
partitions from whioh it had so deeply suffered. 
for this reason, in the last stages of the Conferenoe, 
he took a strong solitary stand on the demand for a 
plebicite that csme up for Silesia. The whole 
British Cabinet supported ~im, and in the end he 
aChieved his purpose. 
Such were the main lines of agreement and 
divergence where divergenoe eXisted, but it must be 
strongly emphasised that only after full discussion 
of the principles involved, did the Conference arrive 
at its final deoision. 
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CHAPTER IV 
WHAT TERRITORY SHOULD POLAND INCLUDE? 
Why Should Poland be restored to life, - and 
to a position in the galaxy of nations? She bad 
been dead so long. why should the political fabrio 
of tOday be disturbed by outting out another nation 
by a Tery old pattern? 
It had been argued with some potency that poland 
should be resurreoted because the equilibrium of 
Central Europe would be restored thereby. and a sure 
and oertain basis for a lasting European peaoe 
seouredl It was alleged that Central Europe had been 
unstable and unbalanced since the disappearanoe of 
poland; again. Poland should be restored to life, 
said the Allies, beoause German expansion to the 
East would be retarded or eTen stopped, and further. 
that poland should be giTen a new lease of existence 
beoause it was right. ETen the ground cried out 
against the injustioes suffered by poland. 
Between 1864, the date of the last Polish 
insurrection, and 1914, Europe as far as possible 
avoided allusion to the Skeleton in the oloset; not 
every state had been guilty of murder, but all had 
58. 
known of it, and none intervened. When the first 
guns were fired in 1914, the oloset door was 
shattered and Poland was found to be alive --
gagged. 
The main faotors whioh heTe preserved Polish 
oonsciousnesl were: the peasants' attaohment to the 
soil, the peoples' stubborn deoi8ion to cling to 
their language, and their faith in God, their ultra-
religious spirit. 
poles, they were, and Poles they had remained; 
they had lived through years of religious and 
national persecution on the part of Russia and 
pruslia, and Withstood victoriously Austria's demora-
lizing polioy of assimilation. Through years of 
torture, of eXile, imprisonment, years of puniShment. 
years of expropriation for speaking their own 
language and teaChing it to their own ohildren, they 
haTe prayed and hoped. The very perseoutions of 
their oppressors made them strong, and during the 
iays of this war these very oppreSsors had to admit 
that their policy of foroible assimilation had not 
only failed. but had had the opposite result from 
the one they desired. 
All knew that poland had fought a hundred 
wars, but not one for oonquest. All of her wars 
had been in self defense, in defense of justioe, 
of right, or of Christianit7. In 1241 at the 
battle of Lignia, she threw baok the !artar 
invaders, and thereb7 saved Germanr. In 1683, 
lohn Sobieski saved Europe from the ottomaa dominion. 
fhe Polish Revolution of 1794 prevented the ooalition 
of the autoorats from aooomplishing the defeat of 
Franoe. Through five oenturies poland bore the brunt 
of Turkish arma, until ahe won the appelation of 
"the Buckler of Ohristendom." 
She has warred otten for the liberty of others. 
poland has been the oradle of the world's liberaliam. 
She oonoluded in 1413, a political union With 
Lithuania, an aot of free union proolaiming for the 
first time in a dooument of almOst evangelical 
beautl, the brotherhood of man. l She was the first 
to provide that, unless legally convicted, no man 
should be imprisoned. 
In 1208. Poland first applied the elective 
franchise. the Polish statute of Wislic&. In 16'3 
1. Gorski, Waclsw D., "fhe Aspirations of poland," 
Outlook ,120 , pp. 628-31, September-December. 1918 
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poland inaugurated a virtual republic; ita ohief 
magistrate was eleoted fOr life, and oalled a king 
but forbidden to lead the militia aoross the frontiers 
exoept with the oonsent of the senate~ And in that 
ver7 same year, the year of st. Bartholomew's night, 
the Polish Senate provided freedom for all creeda, 
the right of every man Within its jurisdiotion to 
worship aa he ohoae. 
!he Polish exeoutives, the kings. were limited 
in their power by an exoessively liberal constitution. 
They were laoking in authority while the nation was 
deprived of a permanent standing arlD7, and thus an 
ea8Y prey to their rapacious neighbors; her fertile 
plains known in anoient times as the granary of 
1 Europe, afforded them an added temptation. 
!he friendly demooratio Entente nations: the 
united 8tate8, England, and France favored the 
re8toration of Poland to life and gave her again 
a ohanoe to hold aloft onoe more the toroh of 
liberalism and to beoome a bulwar~ against Bolsheviks 
and the Germans. 
And last, but not least, from 26,000,000 to 
36.000,000 poles, speaking the Polish language, in 
1. GorSki, isclaw D., "the ASpirations of poland," 
outlook.120, pp. 628-31, September-Deoember. 1918 
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every deoade of history wanted poland restored. 
The poles regarded themselves as the chosen people, 
ohosen not for viotory, but for suffering. "poland 
was the Messiah among the nations. by whose broken 
body and shed blood salvation was to be wrought for 
1 
all the nations of the world." As the partitions 
of Poland had been the greatest crime of the old 
regime. so her resurreotion was to usher in a new 
era of peaoe. From 1770, when a cattle plague 
afforded an excuse for the invasions by foreigners, 
until poland was restored to a position among the 
self-governing nations of the earth by the treaty of 
Versailles. there were always efforts being made by 
some of the Poles to throw off the yoke placed on 
them by the RuSSians, the Austrians, and the Prussians. 
But granted that poland was to be restored and 
should be restored and to be given a free and secure 
acoess to the ses, what was Poland? What territory 
should it have inoluded and what were its proper 
boundaries? What criterion should be used in deter-
Ddning its boundaries? Should the boundaries be 
linguistic, cultur81, economio, geographio, or 
historioal? poland had been erased from the map 80 
1. Temperiey, H. w. v., ~ Cit., p. 23' 
long that it had come to be regarded as a name, a 
1 
memory. a cause rather than a country. 
Now it is clear that the most elementary 
justice demanded the 8etting up of a polish atat. 
with 80me reasonable ohanoe of life. nor was any 
other alternative possible to the Peace Conferenoe, 
even if it had been desired. 
In determining the territorial allotment of 
poland, the Peace Conferenoe considered first 
the principle of viability, that is, that a stat. 
must have resources. size. and access to markets 
2 
to enable it to avoid economic shipwreok. 
In the second place, there had been general 
agreement on the Wilson postulate. that the new 
polish state must (1) include territories inhabited 
by indisputably Polish populationa, (2) be assured 
a free and seoure acoess to the sea, and· (3) b. 
guaranteed political and economic independence and 
territorial integrity. As interpreted by the Polish 
leaders, this meant 8. return to the boundaries of 
the eighteenth century.3 
1. Haskins, Charles Homer and Lord, Robert Howard. 
~ ~, p. 156 
2. Bawman, Isaiah, ~he New World, p. 410 
3. Ibid., p. 410 ------
-
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Many even wished to eee East Prussia included. 
It was taken for granted that Danzig would become 
a Polish port. All of eastern Galacia was assumed 
to be Polish territory, though inhabited large11 by 
Ruthenians. All of Upper 8ileeia was considered 
eS8ential, in order that the vast resouroes of that 
region might be available for rebuilding of poland'. 
industrial life. 
On the northeast lay Lithuania, and the poles 
oould not forget that it was once part of the greater 
poland with a long Baltic coast line. Like other 
states of central Europe in post-war years of chaos 
and unoertainty in both domestic and foreign affairs, 
Poland feared her neighbors and felt that the more 
extensive her territory and larger her population. 
the greater would be her future securit1f 
Geographically, poland is one of the hardest 
countries in the world to define. Clearly marked 
natural frontiers ere somewhat lacking or else, whell 
they can be discerned they do not coincide with the 
historic political boundaries or with present ethno-
graphic boundaries. The carpathians for instance, 
seem to offer an admirable natural frontier on the 
i. Bowman. Isaiah, ~ cii., pp. 411-4i2 
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80uth; neverthele8S, the boundaries of the old 
polish state overlapped this mountain range for 
a considerable distance, and so does the poliah 
linguistio frontier toda7. 
on the north, the Baltio should form the 
natural limit of Poland, but historioal17 Poland 
had seldom ever held more than 8. narrow frontage 
upon that sea, and tOday the area of Polish-speakiDg 
population touches the Baltio only along a short 
stretch of coast, the region of the so-oalled 
"polish Corridor," the subjeot of this Stud7. 
On the east and west no na~ural barrier. 
whatever are to be found in the vast unbroken plain 
Which stretohes across northern Europe from the Low 
60. 
1 Countrie8 to the Urals and across ASia to the pacific. 
It is true that Polish geographers are accustomed 
to treat the whole region between the BaltiO, the 
Carpathians, the Dvina, and the Dnieper as a countr.r; 
to claim for it a high degree of phySical unity With 
respect to its structure, olimate, produotions, river 
systems, and other features; and to argue that this 
entire area ought likeWise to form a political unit, 
poland. Geographic poland thus defined is practicel17 
1. Haskins, Charles Homer and Lord, Robert Howard. 
~~. p. 167 
identioal with historioal poland as it was in 
1 its later periods. 
Ethnographic poland inoludes nearly the whole 
of the so-oalled "Congress Kingdom" of poland, 
most of the former Prussian provinoe of Posen. 
parts of the Prussian provinoes of East and West 
Prussia and 8ilesia, and the western part of 
Galioia. 2 
In addition, there are many Polish enolaves 
soattered about in Eastern Galioia and in the 
61. 
Russian provinoes to the east of the Congress 
Kingdom. There is muoh reason to suppose, however, 
that if ever an honest oensus is taken here, the 
eastern limits of the Polish ethnographio area 
would be extended considerably beyond the boundaries 
of the Congress Kingdom. Historically the name 
"Poland" has been applied to a state with very Widely 
3 fluotuating frontiers. 
The hundred years of Russian rule sinoe the 
Partitions and Violent attempts at Russifioation 




HaSkins, Charles Homer and Lord, Robert Howard, 
~~, pp. 157-58 
lDId., p. 158 
......... Ibid., p. 159 
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nullified the results of four oenturies of 
polonization in the eastern territories. Even 
tOday in Lithuania proper and in large areas of 
white Russis and the western Ukraine, the country 
gentry and the non-Jewish population of the towns 
1 
are predominantly Polish. 
It would probably be trae that the average 
pole has, at the back of his head, the' feeling that 
his country i8 not merely the modest area of ethno-
graphic poland, but the whole wide expanse of 
historic Poland; poland as it was in 1772, just 
before the partitions. ~his conoeption is based 
partly upon the principle that the partitions, a8 
lawless acts of usurpations, could have no legal 
validity, so that real Poland still exists within 
62. 
her frontiers of 1772; partly upon the view that the 
lands between the Carpathians, the Baltio, the Dnieper. 
and the Dvina possess so high a degree of geographical. 
economic, and cultural unity that they deBerve to be 
considered as one country. 
The wide dispersion of the Polish race, the 
divergence between what is ethnically Polish today, 
and what was historically, and still is in part 
I. RiskinB, Charles Homer and Lord, Robert HOWard, 
~ ~, p. 163 
oulturally. polish, the laok of adequate data 
as to the ethnio makeup and politioal gravitation 
of so many of the border populations, the lack of 
olear out, natural frontiers, suoh are some of the 
difficulties in the way of defining Poland's proper 
boundaries Or in deoiding what is poland or what 
1 
territory poland should inolude. 
We now pass to more speoific oonsideration of 
the so-oalled polish Corridor, the oreation of the 
Peace Conferenoe·of paris for the purpose of giving 
Poland a safe and seoure outlet to the sea. 
1. Haskins, CharleS Homer and Lord, Robert Howard, 
~~, p. 170 
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ClUPTER V 
THE POLISH CORRIDOR 
CHAPTER V 
THE POLISH CORRIDOR 
The wedge-shaped sector of land called the 
polish Corridor runs inland from the Baltic Sea 
for a distance of 46 mile_across territory Whioh 
at the olose of the World war was a part of the 
German Empire. At the ooast it is merely 20 mile_ 
wite, inoreasing in width to 60 miles at the oenter 
and 160 miles at the extreme south. 
Geographically, the limits of the Corridor are 
hard to fix. for the simple reason that the Germans 
themselvea have never set a definite limit to the 
territory which they olaim as the Corridor. In 
praotioe, however, it is generally understood t. 
include the present Polish provinoe of pomerelia 
and the Netse district belonging to the adjoinins 
province of posen, that is, the territory taken by 
prussia in the first partition of poland, together 
with the district now included in the Danzig Free 
State. Thus delimited. it baa an area roughly equal 
to that of Massaohusetts and Conneotiout oombined. 
and a .populstlon of somewh8.t leS8 than a million and 
a half. 
Historioally, the region of the Corridor 
has been the battle ground of Slav and Teuton for 
more than seven centuries. The struggle began when 
a Polish Duke of ~.ovia invited the Teutonio 
Knights to establish themselves on the east bant 
of the Vistula River and to undertake the task of 
oonquering and converting the pagan Pruss ian. who 
were troubling his borders. This was in the year 
1226 and during the next hundred years the Teutonio 
Knights established themselves in all the regions 
between the Nieman and Vistula Rivers. Their 
capital was at Marienburg on the Nogat. Onoe 
established, however, the Teutonio Order waged 
war equally with Pcle and Prussian. The latter 
were presently either assimilated or annihilated, 
• 
and thousands of colonists were brought from South 
Germany to settle this Wilderness. 
In the fourteenth century, the Order crossed 
the Vistula and repeated its exploits. Here again. 
conquest was followed by colonization. H~ceforth. 
therefore, the population on this left bank of the 
Viatula was mixed, while Danzig became what it ba. 
always remained, a purely Teutonic town. In the 
fifteenth century. the Poles defeated the Teutonio 
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Enighta at Tannenberg, on the same field where 
five hundred years later Von Hindenburg won hia 
great victory over the Russians. 
Thereafter, the disintegration of the Order 
W8S rapid and the Second Treaty of Thorn in 1466 
not onl7 restored the west bank of the Vistula to 
poland, along With Danzig, but transformed the 
Grand ~ster of the Order into a vaesal of the 
polish throne for the East Prussian Duch7. 
In the eighteenth century, ~rederick the Great 
found himself possessed of this prussian DuCh7 whioh 
had passed to the Electors of Brandenburg, and hal 
thus esoaped from Polish suzeraint7, but was still 
separated from hie other dominions by the Polish 
Corridor, erected by the Treaty of Thorn. 
To abolish this Corridor and establish terri-
torial unity for hiB kingdom, he engineered the Piret 
partition of Poland. 
66. 
The Second and Third partitions extended prussiaa 
holdings of Polish territory, and even Napoleon --
great friend as he was supposed to be to the poles 
in oreatinghis skortlived Grand Duchy of warsaw, 
refrained from restoring the Corridor. ~inally the 
Congres8 of Vienna confirmed prussian title to the 
Corridor whioh now became west Prussia, and title 
to posen as well, and this oondition endured 
thereafter until the olose of the World War. 
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lrom an historioal standpoint, the Pole. base 
their olaim to the Corridor upon original posseasion 
and three oenturies of undisturbed oooupanoy between 
1466, the date of signing the Second ~reaty of !horn, 
and 1772, the time of the first partition of poland. 
!he Germans rest their claim and title to the Corridor 
upon the conquest and oolonization by the !eutonio 
Knights and upon the century and a half of possesaion 
between 1772, the time of the first partition, and 
1919 whioh i8 the date of the Signing of the ~reaty 
of Versaillea. 
Ethnioally, the Situation as respeots the Corridor 
is even mOre intrioate as a oonsequenoe of the long 
centuries of intermingling. !hat the territory was 
originally inhabited by Slavs before the advent ot 
the Teutonic Order now 8eems oertain. That before 
the World war, East Prussia was largely Germanized 
and West Prussia partially, is equal17 true. 
In 1919, that is. at the moment of the making 
of the Treaty of Versailles, the situation was oon-
fuaed; in fact, all depended upon the area ohosen for 
r 
a test. Thus in the whole provinoe of prussia 
and the Netle district, there was an undoubted 
German ma3orit7. In the region aotual17 take. 
from Germany, that is, the Corridor and the nanlig 
Jree state, While the margin wae mnoh narrower, 
the German advantage was still probably oonolusive. 
On the other hand, in the area aotually trana-
ferred to poland, the Slavs, quite as oertainly, 
outnumbered the Teutons. But even here, the German. 
olaim, with justioe, that not all the Slavs are 
pol •• , and with far less warrant, that the cassubiane, 
living in the Tuohola Heath and farther north oannot 
be fairly oredited to their rivals. 
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These claims and counter olaims remain somewhat 
hazy and unoertain beoause they are based on the German 
side on Prussian statistios whioh were notoriously 
partial, and no plebiscite was ever oonducted. 
The Poles had an indeoisive majority according 
to Prussian statistios. On the eve of the World war 
there were 990,000 inhabitants. 437,412 were Germane, 
448,773 were poles and 104,000 were cashubes, a people 
affiliated olosely with the Poles, ethnographioally 
speaking. 
Koreover, Poland maintained that the ethnographio 
prinoiple oould not be followed too minute17, 
beoause the Oorridor was the soene of intensive 
oonoentration by German oolonists aided by the 
Prussian government. The German Imperial Coloni-
sation COmmission in thirty years, spent 600,000,000 
marks in buying up property in the eastern provinoes 
and settling German oolonists upon it, thu8 dis-
possessing the Poles of a land whioh had been theirs 
for a thousand years. 
Half a dozen other offioial and semi-offioial 
organisations have been at work for the same purpose. 
Over 100,000 Germans have been brought in in this 
wa7- In addition, a host of government funotionarie8 
and servante estimated to be from one-fifth to one-
third of the German population have been brought in 
from the outside for the purpose of impressing an 
1 
artifioial German oharacter upon a Polish land. 
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The substantial preference Whioh the German farmer 
enjoyed gradually foroed out Polish settlers. It i. 
difficult for even the Germane to deny these patent 
facts. 
The absenoe of a vote was explained by Wilson's 
deoision to bestow upon Poland aooess to the sea over 
1. Haskins, Charles Homer and Lord, Robert Howard, 
Ope Cit., pp. 174-76 
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her own territory. To giTe effeot to this deoision 
inTolved restoring the Corridor as it had existed 
before the First Partition. President Wilson's 
deoision was based upon the obTious fact that the 
new Poland would haTe an area greater than that of 
Italy and a population in excess of Spain. and 
without free access to the sea, this large area 
and its great population would be eoonomioally at 
the meroy of Germany, which would hold its natural 
sea gates. President Wilson. too, was profoundly 
influenced by what he conceived to be the moral 
issues involved in undoing the work of the parti-
tioners. 
But the oase of Poland is unique, moreover, 
in that it has an ethnic group of indisputable 
1 Polish people. straight through to the sea. Thia 
70. 
waa the first and the principal reason for the 
establishment of this now famous Polish Corridor by 
the Peace Conferenoe. Poland needed territorial 
acoess to the sea. No one would seriously dispute 
that. But it is doubtful that the Peaoe Conferenoe 
would have granted her an outlet to the sea where it 
1. Bask1ns, Charles Homer and Lord, Robert Howard, 
~~, p. 178 
r 
was granted had the Oonference not been justified 
in its opinion in doing so on ethnographic, as well 
as historical and economic ground •• 
Thus there existed at the time the treaty wa. 
made, on the west bank of the Vistula River an 
unbroken corridor of Polish-speaking territory 
extending through well nigh to the sea. The Germans 
have never bridged successfully this gap between the 
old German lands in the West and the isolated 
German colony in East Prussia. 
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Apparently, wisdom and justice guided the handa 
that created the Polish Corridor. If there had been 
any good way around it, it might have been an 
undesirable arrangement. It seemed the only solution 
to the problem that had any ethnographic reasons for 
its creation. We shall later observe some suggestiona 
that have been proposed for a different outlet to 
the sea for Poland. But each of these proposals has 
as many or more objections as has the present outlet. 
The solution merely restores the territorial 
situation that existed here for three hundred yeara 
down to the time of the ~irBt partition in 1772. Nor 
can the continuity of German territory be maintained 
without denying Poland acoess to the sea. 
r 
In reality. what we now call the poliah 
Corridor appears tOday to have been in some fashion 
a German dam strete'hed across the Pomeranian plains, 
holding back the Slav tide from the age of Frederick 
the Great to that of William II. But once the dam 
had been abolished by the Treaty of Versailles, the 
Slav tidal wave swept down the Corridor to the sea 
in a vast and irresistible drive which has all but 
wiped out the last vestiges of German construction 
as today there is a great preponderance of PoleS in 
this region. 
poland was given then a minimum direct access 
to the sea. The Polish Corridor was intended to 
promote favorable commercial contacts between poland 
and the industrial and commercial centers of Western 
Europe. Post war developments have made this 
irreducible minimum of aooess even more vital to 
poland than ever before. Placed between a Communist 
Russie with whom normal trade is impossible and a 
Germany who will not buy what poland has to offer, 
Poland has been compelled to reorient the direction 
of her entire foreign trade. 
The main currents of that trade no longer run 
between the east and west, but from south to north. 
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pOlish imports and exports follow the Vistula 
river and show a tendenoy to develop towards the 
Baltic nations and the great Western powers, i. e., 
England, Pranoe, Italy and the United states, by 
virtue of her sea coast and the possibility of 
oommunioation by sea. poland is a quasi neighbor 
of these oountries, whereas, aooording to the 
theais suggested by German propaganda, she should 
be only a state shut in by the territories of 
Germany and Russia. Britain has beoome an important 
purohaser of poland's agrioultural produoe, the 
Soandanavian oountries of her ooal, and more distant 
oversea lands buy in inoreasing quantities what 
oannot be Bold to Polandrs oontinental neighbors. 
poland once more, as in the sixteenth oentury, must 
be a Baltio power, or not be at all. 
one bas then to faoe the simple faot that here 
are two nations, one of 65,000,000 (more now in view 
of reoent annexation), the other of 32,000,000 faoing 
each other over a more or less imaginary line, 
mutually resolved to oarry out purposes which are 
irreooncilable. They are actually engaged upon this 
tront in a struggle whioh differs from real war 
only in the faot that it is oonduoted, not by armies, 
----------------- --------- -- _. 
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but by all the forces of public opinion and pro-
paganda. What is most disturbing is that thia 
struggle steRdily inflames public feeling, exaoer-
bates national passion, promotes despair. !ut the 
trouble With the situation is that there can be no 
answer as long as Europe and the world remain 
dominated by nationalistic sentiments. For the 
problem of the Polish Corridor there are two 
solutions: A German and a Polish, but there is no 
disposition to compromise at present. poland insiste 
upon retaining an outlet to the sea over her ow. 
land, while Germany refuses to endure the isolation 
of East Prussia from the Reich. Without disoussing 
more fully such purely domestic German problems, it 
must plainly be stated that, in the last resort, the 
issue lies between greater Or less economic incon-
venience for one German province on the one hand, 
and the existence or non-existence of the entire thirty-
two million Polish state on the other. 
Poland can pOint to her historical experience in 
the parti~on period which showed that the annexation 
of her sea-side lands by Prussia at the Second partition 
in 1793 meant the cutting of the jugular arter3 of her 
political-economic organism. Under the existing 
r 
oircumstances, German communication with East 
prussia by land is at the mercy of poland save 
for treaty guaranty; after revision, polish acces. 
to the sea would be at the mercy of Germany. 
In this situation it is clear that question. 
of economic right, race, language and history are 
relatively 8ubordinate. Yet, both the Germans and 
poles can fortify their claims by such detail •• 
fhe Polish state as it exists today, combines in 
its larger bulk a number of requirements for an existence 
1 
economically 80und as well as politically independent. 
But it was this very creation of a "greater poland" 
which not only entangled the new republic in inevitable 
conflicts with almost all her neighbors. but also called 
forth remonstrances from among the western European 
authors of her restoration. 
fhere were writers and publicists of standing 
and renown who frequently expressed the opinion that 
it was a mistake that poland was re-established in 
somewhat like her wide eighteenth-century frontiers, 
which once already had been the cause of international 
complications and of disaster to the country. 
When the treaty was still in draft General Smuts 
1. femperley, H. W. V. t ~~, Vol. VI. p. 218 
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of South Afrioa warned the Paris Conferenoe that 
it had made Poland too strong for the peaoe of 
Europe, and advised its ourtailment as a measure 
of preoaution while there was still time. 
- A letter of General J. J. C. Smuts to the 
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Prime Minister, Lloyd George, Kay 22, 1919, critioized 
the terms as drawn and suggested changes. 
:u.a1 22, 1919 
!he Prime Minister 
In re GermaD7's Eastern Frontier 
I am convinced that in the undue 
enlargement of Poland we are not only 
reversing the verdict of history, but 
cOmmitting a cardinal error in polioy 
whioh history will yet avenge. The new 
Poland will include millions of German. 
and Russians and territories whioh have 
a German or Russian population, or whioh 
have for very long periods been part of 
Germany or Russia. It is reasonably 
oertain that both Germany and Russia 
will again be great powers, and that 
sandwiched between them the new poland 
could only be a success with their good 
will. How, under these oircumstanoes, can 
we expect poland to be other than a failure, 
even if she had that ruling and administra-
tive oapacity Which history has proved that 
ahe has not? Even now While the conference 
is Sitting, the Poles are defying the Great 
Powers. What is going to happen in the 
future with the Great powers diTide4 
and at loggerheads? I think we are 
building a house of sand. And in 
Tiew of the.e and many other con,i-
derationa, I would reTiae the boun-
daries of Poland as proTisionall, 
settled in the Treaty, leaTe uPper 
8ile.ia and all real German territory 
to Germ8n7. oontract the boundaries 
of the Free City of Danzig, and 
instead of placing her under the 
suzerainty of poland as we propose 
doing leave her under the .uzeraint, 
of Germany with an administration 
under the League of Nations. I think 
the two cardinal errors in policy of 
this treaty are the long occupation 
of the Rhine, and the enlargement of 
poland beyond anything which we had 
conteaplated during the war. These 
two errorS are full of menace for the 
future peace of Europe, and I urge 
that eTery means be taken to remove 
thea before it is too late. There is 
no doubt that the German Delegates are 
going to make a stiff fight, perhaps 
a condition for signature of the Treaty. 
that the settlement of their Eastern 
frontiers in 8ilesia, East and West 
Prussia, should be revised. I would 
advise that we consider the case to be 
put forward by thea more oarefu11y on 
its merits. 
The danger which General Smuts pOinted out had 
been antiCipated more than seventy years before by 
otto Von Bismark, who saw further than most statesmen 
of his century. As early as 1848. long before he 
". 
1. Biker, Ray Stannard, 'ooaro. Illson and toril 
Settlement. Vol. III, Document No. 6~pp. 458-465 
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entered official life. Bismark acourate17 predioted 
the territorial ambitions in whioh poland would 
indulge if it were ever to be reconstituted with 
the province of posen as a jumping-board. Then, 
78. 
he wrote. "She would not rest until it had reconquered 
from us the Vistula mouth and every Polish village 
1 in west and East Prussia, pomerania, and Si1e8ia." 
Germany cannot become reconoiled to the lose 
of several large provinoes into Whioh, sinoe she 
took them from Poland, she has put a great amount 
of organizing effOrt and also of oapital. 
It appears that the Corridor is too narrow to 
be suooessfully defended against Germany or other 
2 bordering enemies both in the east and the west. 
It was the wish and hope of the PoliSh leaders at 
the Peaoe Conference, that they would be given. 
broader stretoh of land than that ocoupied indis-
putably by Polish populations. 
Their hope was based upon the relation of the 
polish State to the Vistula River. For the relation 
of the Vistula River to all Poland is that of the 
1. Dawson, WIlliam Harbutt, Germany Under the Treatl, 
p. 38' 
2. Buell, Raymond Les11e, ~~. pp. 320-321 
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Miasissippi River to the great central region of 
the United states. Since the earliest time this 
river has been assooiated with Polish nationality_ 
They have inhabited its plains for ages. rrom the 
Carpathian MOuntains to the Sea, its banks have 
long been bordered by Polish populations. !hey 
have possessed its shores, even if the sovereignty 
of the river belonged to someone else. 
poland derived economic as well as cultural 
and Psychologioal strength from the Vistula in a 
higher degree than, for instanoe, Germany does from 
the Rhine, the source and mouth of whioh are outSide 
of German territory, and the upper parts of whioh 
constitutes the boundary line between Germany and 
SWitzerland, and Germany and Franoe. The Vi.tul. 
is in faot, the backbone of poland, her old oapital, 
Craoow, her neW oapital, warsaw, and once her only 
port, Danzig, are all Situated on the banks of the 
Vistula. 
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The arrangement of the Corridor has been denounoed 
by the oritics of the Treaty of Versailles on the 
ground that this Corridor outs off Germany from their 
East PruBsian PrOVince, and that it is something that 
the Germans will never stand for permanently. 
r 
It is alleged that the isolation of East 
Prussia effected by the Peace Treaty is unnatural, 
unique in the modern world, and ruinous to the 
province so separated from the body of Germ&n7. 
As against this. it must be emphasized that similar 
"Corridors" are not unknown elaewhere; the Canadian 
"Corridor" to Vancouve~ to mention only the instance 
most familiar to British and Amerioan readers, haa 
never been an obstacle to the development of Alaska 
as part of the United states,nor as a cause of enmitJ 
has it ever come between the two nations. 
With regard to East Prussia. it is a well 
established fact that German transit across the 
Corridor, &8 safeguarded by international conventions 
and often checked both by official authorities and 
private foreign observere. l was facilitated in every 
w&7. and POland has never declined to discuss further 
extensions of these facilities. But it is pleaded 
80. 
that East Prussia has suffered gravely in her economic 
life through her detachment, and a movement of 
emigrations from that province into the interior of 
Germany has actually set in. The German budget is 
burdened with large expenditure on "relief to the East,ft 
whioh as a matter of fact was largely used for the 
1. Haskins, Chir1ee Homer and Lord, Robert Howard, 
~ ~. p. 180 
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politioal end of promoting and strengthening 
Germanism along the Polish border. 
The oompla1nts regarding the economio situation 
of East Prussia are not altogether unfounded, but 
are certainl7 exaggerated. The oonditione, desoribed 
as effects of the isolation of the province, are 
part of the general economio situation of GermaD7 
whioh i8 due to a great many factors other thaa the 
territorial settlement. They are also part of the 
economic relations of commeroial diffidence or 
open "tariff war" now unfortUJJately so general 
81. 
between European statea. It is East prussia whioh 
standS in the way of favorable trade treaties with 
Poland. the agrarian olass-interest of her large 
landowners -- a thorough17 reactionary and fanatioally 
ne.tionalist group -- being allowed to oarry undue 
weight in the oouncils of Germany's rulers. 
Should a million and a half or two m1llion of 
Germans have rights that outweigh 27,000.000 to 
32.000.000 Poles in the Hinterland to a seoure aocess 
to the Baltio Sea?l Clearly the Polish interest i. 
inoomparably the greater and ought to take preoedenoe. 
1. laskins. Charles Homer and.Lord, Robert Howard, 
~~. p. 180 
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Therefore, very properly, the Conferenoe created 
the ·Corridor" for the access of poland to the sea. 
poland onoe again, as in the eighteenth oentur7, 
may be an obstaole in the way of German aspirations, 
and if Germany so strongly resents the existenoe of 
the Polish Corridor, it is oertainly not only beoause 
the Corridor outs off E~st Prussia from Germany, but 
because it is a barrier between Germany and Russia. 
What Germany wants to effect by the removal of the 
polish Corridor is the creation of 8 new and muoh 
broader "Corridor" over the head of Poland, uniting 
Germany with Russia. The small Baltic states. 
particularly Lithuania, would then serve but as a 
oontinuation of a German "Corridor" so conoeived. 
It is plain, then, that it is not against the 
Polish Corridor as it exists tOday, but against a 
polish Corridor, in faot, against an7 and ever7 
oorridor to the Baltio that the efforts of Germany 
are and will be direoted. 
It would be dangerous to the whole European 
system for Germany and Russia to be so olosely 
united. If this danger is to be avoided, the 
maintenanoe of not only poland as a Whole, but of 




to be a trulr wise and far sighted European polior. 
If poland and Europe are to be safe and remain safe. 
the Baltio must beoome neither a German nor a Russian 
nor & Russo-German lake, but remain & European and 
a world lake. 
~he Corridor was oonstruoted at·a moment when 
the prinoiple of nationalitr dominated any other 
oonsideration. Whether one judges aooording to the 
principles established by the Versailles Treaty, or 
aocording to some personal standard, there is one 
point upon whioh all have agreed: as a result of the 
interdependence of nations so generallr disoussed 
tOdar. no oorridor oan remain a trouble maker for 
Poles and Germans alone. Danger of war between two 
nations is a danger of war to the world. This is a 
verr good reason everyone should be interested in 
the solution of this international problem. 
Suggested alternatives.to the Oorridor may be 
mentioned to show how unaoceptable they are for 
Poland. The absorption ot the O.orridor together With 
Danzig and East Prussia into the body of a reunited 
Germany oould, it is said, be compensated to 
poland by the right to use all northeastern 
83. 
German harbors from Stettin to Konigsberg. But 
thoee who haTe a knowledge of present day inter-
national conditions must realize that any guarantees 
which oould be given for the inviolability of suoh 
commercial "rights of way" are worthless in a Burope 
deprived of a strong international exeoutive. l 
!he 8ame objeotion is made to the idea of 
erecting Dansig together with the Corridor, and 
possibly East Prussia, into a neutral politioal 
unit under international administration. 
!he ·Free City" of Danzig alone has caused more 
than enough trouble to the League of Nations in the 
last twelve year.; a larger territory under inter-
national oontrol in that part of the world would 
prove much more unmanageable and would only be a 
source of constant quarrels and anxietiea.! 
There is a third proposal which has been 
tentatively broached and i8 favored by some Britiah 
atatesmen. It proposes to return the Corridor and 
the acoess to the sea at Danzig to Germany, in return 
for whioh, poland should reoeive access to the aea 
further east, by way of Kemel, through territory 
1. D;rboskl, Roman, QR.:. Cit.. p. 399 
2. Ibid., p. 399 
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which is now German. But this would cause a 
violent, unnatural snd entirely impraoticable 
twist to poland's whole system of communication. 
by 46 degree., a twist that is wasteful and diffi-
oult because the portions of the oountry that need 
a direot outlet to the sea such as the Silesian 
ooal fields would be then farthest away from the 
outlet to the sea. Then too, the Memel plan would 
involve a thorough ohange in poland's relatione 
with Lithuania, the re-establishment in faot, of 
1 the historioal union between the two oountries. 
Lithuania. at present, shrinks at the thought 
of a renewal of the union, beoause she fears that 
in 8uoh a union her national distinotness would be 
endangered through weight of numbers and through 
Polish oultural influence. 
The paris Peaoe Conference saw fit to make a 
most oomplioated and artifioial arrangement for 
poland's outlet to the sea. It took Danzig from 
Germany but did not give it to poland. However. 
the oontrol of the Corridor to the sea would be of 
little or no advantage without the oontrol of its 
natural terminus, the port of DansiS. Danzig is 
1. Dyboaltl, Roman, .2E.:. £!l:., p. "00 
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the end of the Corridor, the port of entry and the 
port of exit for the Vistula River, the great 
river of Poland. Dan.ig had belonged to the former 
Polish state and had greatly prospered as all the 
ooean oommeroe of the oountry had passed through 
its harbor. prussia had aoquired it in 1793 in the 
Seoond partition, and as late as 1813, the City 
Counoil of Danzig besought the Powers of Europe to 
reunite Danzig to Poland and not to inoorporate it 
1 
with Prussia. Very prosperous and oontented under 
Polish rule, Danzig largely lost its prosperity under 
the Germans. The poles, beoause they regarded the 
oity as rightfully theirs and also beoause it was 
their only outlet to the sea, expeoted that it would 
be inoluded in the new state. 
86. 
The so-oalled "Cambon" Commission, the CommiSSion 
appointed by the Conference to make boundary recommen-
dations, deoided on two occaSions after impartial 
looal investigation that Danzig should be unoonditionally 
alloted to poland. That it was not, was due to the 
opposition of Lloyd George, with whom president Wilson 
was persuaded to agree, Clemenoeau aoquiescing, though 
unwillingly. 
1. Haskins, Charles Homer and Lord, Robert Howard, 
~ Oit., p. 181 
~he reason for not giving Danzig to the pole. 
was that Danzig end the region around about, with 
a population of about 360,000, was overwhelmingly 
German in stook, speech and sympathy. thus it waa 
undesirable to in~orporate into poland so large • 
87. 
body of persons who would neoes8arily be a disoontented 
and therefore a weakening element in the new stat •• 
~he reason is not impressive coming from men who 
lapsed eaSily from the principle here involved in 
their settlement of other questions that came before 
them. ~hree hundred thousand Germans of the Austrian 
~yrol were handed over to Italy on strategic grounds 
and three million to Czecho-Slovakia on historical 
grounds. The same arguments might have been mad. or 
applied to Danzig with greater foroe from the point 
of view of Polish national deference and with equal 
foroe from that of historioal righto 
Although Germany had accepted president Wilson's 
fourteen pOintB, the German delegation protested 
against the proposal which would give poland aoceB8 
to the sea, and insisted that the sea ooast. Danzig, 
and the mouth of the Vistula River, should remain in 
German handa. 
~he German protest was rejeoted in the well-known 
r 
letter of Clemenoeau, president of the Peaoe 
Conferenoe, dated June 16, 1919, and in the enolo.e' 
note: 
-The reply of the Allied and Assooiated Powers 
to the observations of the German Delegation on the 
Conditions of peaoe. l 
"poland will be given oertain economic rights 
in D&nsig and the oity itself bas been severed from 
Germany beoause in no other way was it possible to 
provide for that free and Seoure access to the sea 
which Germany has promised to concede. 
-The German oounter-proposals -- deny seoure 
aooess to the sea to a nation of over thirty-two 
million people, whose nationals are in the majority 
all the way to the coast, in order to maintain 
territorial connection between East and west Prussia, 
whose trade has always been mainly sea borne. They 
oannot, therefore, be accepted by the Allied and 
Associated Powers.-
The relevant passages in the Allies' reply read 
88. 
as follows: "Section IX -- East Prussia -- for poland --
For Poland to have immediate and unbroken oommunioation 
With Danzig and the remainder of the coast by railways 
1. Slowski, Dr. Stanislaw, poland's Aocess to the Sea, 
-------- ------ -- --- ---p. 5 
whioh are entirely under the oontrol 0 f the Polish 
state is essential. The inoonvenienoe o8usec1 to 
East Prussia by the new frontier is nesligible 
oompared to that whioh would be oaused to poland 
by any other arrangement. 
"Seotion XI. Danzig, -- The eoonomio interests 
of Danzig and poland are identical. lor Danzig as 
the great part of the valley of the Vistula, the 
most intimate oonnection with Poland is essential. 
The annexation of west Prussia, inoluding Danzig, 
to Germany. deprived poland of that direot aooe88 
to the sea whioh was hers by right. The Allied and 
Assooiated powers propose that this direot aooeS8 
shall be restored. 
"It is not enough that poland should be allowed 
the use of German ports; the ooast, short 8S it ia, 
whioh is Polish, must be restored to her. poland 
olaims, and justly olaims that the oontrol and 
development of the port whioh is her sole opening 
89. 
to the sea shall be in her hands and that the oommuni-
oations between it and Poland shall not be subjeoted 
to any foreign oontrol, so that in this, one of the 
most important aspeots of national life, Poland 






A olause in Artiole 89 provides that Poland should 
guarantee free transit between Germany and East Pruseia. 
In aooordance with this provision and in exeoution of 
Artiole 98 of the Treaty of Vereailles, a po11sh-German 
convention was oonoluded in parie on April 21, 1921. 
The said convention oame into foroe as from Jttne 1922, 
and i8 be1ng oarried out by Poland to the complete 
satisfaotion of Germany's transport and eoonomio needa. 
poland's acoese to the sea, in a geograph10al and 
territorial sense, is formed by the Polish ooastal 
terr1tory. 
The pr1noipal stipulat10ns of the Treaty of 
Versailles and the paris Convention oonoluded between 
Poland and Danzig and dated November 9, 1920 are the 
follow1ng: 
(a) Danzig is a Free City under the proteot1on 
of the League of Nat1ons. 
(b) Danzig is included 1n the Polish frontier, 
in so far as oustoms and duties are ooncerned. 
(0) Poland oonducts DanZig's fore1gn relations. 
(d) The railway system and its control are give. 
to Poland. 
1. S1awski, Dr. stanis!aw, ~ Cit., p. 6 
(e) Poland has the right to establish in 
the port postal, telegraphic, and telephonic 
communioation with Poland on the one hand 
and with foreign countries on the other. 
(f) Besides the above mentioned convention, 
the juridical basis of the Free City of 
Danzig is to be found in its constitution, 
elaborated in conjunction with the High 
Commissioner of the League of Nations. who 
permanently holds office in Danzig, and 
who, in the first instance arbitrates in 
all disputes which may arise between poland 
and the 'ree City of Danzig. 
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(g) The Polish minority in Danzig shall enjoy 
the same protection as national minorities enjoy 
in Poland. 
(h) !he exploration and management of the 
port. that part of the Vistula which flow. 
through the territory of Danzig, the canals 
and immovable property formerly belonging to 
Germany and Prussia, come under the adminis-
tration of a mixed governing body consisting 
of representatives of Poland and of Danzig, 
i. e., "the Harbor and Waterways Board." At 
the head of this Board are a Polish Commissioner 
who represents the Polish GOTernment on the one 
side, and a Danzig Commissioner. representing the 
rree City, on the other. ~he Harbor Board must 
guarantee to Poland the free uee and service 
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of the port and means of Communication. •• 
stipulated in Article 20, without 8n7 restrictions. 
(i) !he Constitution voted by the Constituent 
Assembly of Danzig in May 1920 was accepted and 
adopted by the Counoil of the League of Nations 
after certain modifications had been made. 
According to this constitution the Pree City i. 
governed by the Senate which is vested with 
exeoutive power. 
Seven senators are eleoted eTery four years b7 
the Lower Chamber. while the other fourteen are 
parliamentary senatore. In 1922 a new constitution 
was approved by the League. The Senate consisted of 
ten members containing a president and a vice-president. 
In order that a statute may become law, both the 
Senate and the Chamber must agree. !he Chamber now 
consists of 72 deputies,l 
1. siowski, Dr. Stanislaw, OR. ~, p. 9 
The Free City of nanzig did not come into 
existence from the time of the ratification of 
the Treaty of Versailles but only by virtue of an 
additional declaration dated October 27, 1920, 
made by England, France, Italy and Japan, on the 
strength of Article 102 of the Treaty of Versailles. 
Acoordingly the Frea City of nan.ig came into 
existance on November 16, 1920, and Simultaneously 
the Polish-Dansig Convention, Which embodies thl 
principal Pclish laws concerning the access to 
the eea through the territory of the 'ree City of 
Dansig, came into effect. 
The only reason why Danzig wss detached from 
Germany and made a Free City was the desire to 
eecure free accese to the sea for poland. The fact 
that the original decision wae to assign nanzig to 
poland is authentic prcof of this desire. Dansig 
is infinitely more alive and prosperous today than 
she was before the war, when Hamburg overshadowed 
her. This Ba.ltic trade accomplished Within a fe" 
short years, could now be reversed only at the cost 
of oomplete economic ruin, and oonsequently of 
political destruction, to the entire fabric of the 
93. 
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new polish stat.. It is an axiom of Polish public 
opinion regardless of the party, that unimpeded 
aocesa to the Baltio is a fundamental oondition 
of Poland's continued existenoe. 
In accordanoe with the Treaty of 'Versailles, 
poland received coastal territory Without a port, as 
well 8S oertain rights in the port of Danzig Without 
territory. OWing to the faot that Poland is only 
part owner of Danzig port and that she has to oope 
with great difficulties connected with the oomplicated 
administrative system of the port, she has seen fit 
to build with the assistanoe of Frenoh oapital, her 
own port at Gdynia. Of Which faot, the Germans 
oonstantly oomplained to the League of Nations and 
to others that the neW port is and will be an ever-
lasting menace to Danzig'S prosperity. 
The compelling reason for building this new aea 
port at Gdynia for Poland was due to the perSistent 
disloyalty of Danzig to poland, to her oonstant 
evasions of treaty obligations, her organized enoourage-
ment of smuggling on a large soale, and her enmity to 
polish interest. l Beoause of the deadlook in economio 
1. Dyboaki, Roman, ~~. p. 398 
.. 
relations with Germany, it was necesaary that the 
eea-born trade of roland should be foroibly 
deTeloped. It soon was Tery eT14ent that poland 
had enough trade to make Gdynia and Danzig prosperou8 
and in 1933 poland agreed that 45~ of its imports 
and exports should pass through Danzig. 
It is a faTorite Polish story that in 1920 
Herr Sohm who is now Lord Mayor of Berlin, but who 
was at that time president of the Danzig Senate, 
had, after refusing to let the Poles import arms 
for their Russian war in 1920, deriBiTely told them 
to build their own port on the quick sands of the 
fiBhing village of Gdynia. 80 they d1d. By 1926 
Gdynia was able to function and in 1932 its harbor 
traffic reached and passed the Danzig 1eTel. In 
1936 it handled more commerce than any other city On 
the Baltio 8ea.1 With the help o~ Irench capital, 
s railway was built from the Kattowitz ooal mine up 
to Gdyni., and the ooal traffio easl1y diTerte4 
2 from Dansig. 
The location chosen by the Government for the 
1. WOlfe. Henry C., nThe Ghos'E of the Corrlctor, w 
Hew Republic, 92:240, 1937 
2. lrikemann, Elizabeth, "poland and Germany Todsy." 
Fortnightl,, 144 CHS 138): 304-13 S. 1936 
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ereotion of the port i8 ideal; it is looated on 
the Bay of puok, a bay which oould hold all the 
navies of the world today. !he depth of the bay 
near the shore is thirty to sixty feet, the bed 
of the harbor is very good for anohorage and the 
entrance is sheltered by the Peninsula of Hel. All 
foreign experts have agreed that Gdynia i8 by nature 
fitted for a port. 
Does Poland really need a port of her own? 
Does she need to own in fee Simple her own sea 
board? DoeS she need or require speoial rights in 
Danzig? Could she not use some of the other ports 
of Germany also? Ie not Gdynia sufficient for her 
needs? Are there not many countries which do not 
possess sea ooasts or ports and yet manage to exist 
very well? Poland does and no doubt wants to u.e 
some German ports. She is direoting a oonsiderable 
part of her exports and imports through Stettin and 
Konigsberg beoaus.e of their oommunicational and 
geographical location and position. 
As owner of the port of Gdynia and part owner 
of a port at Danzig, poland can also be a oustomer 
in the ports of Stettin and Konigsberg. But poland's 
needs oannot be satisfied by the use of German ports. 
96. 
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Neither oan Polandts existence nor her political 
and economic independence be so reconciled. poland 
could not develop her navigation and foreign trade 
out of German ports to the degree she could from her 
cwn porta, for there would be the German shipbuilder, 
forwarding agent, importer and exporter. who would 
step in as a middleman between the foreign merohant 
and the Polish producer or importer. 
Germany may want Polish commerce to depend on 
Germany's caprice and whims. Germany would be able 
to fix her own port tariffs, and more important still, 
her own railway tariffs; Poland would be compelled to 
pay the tribute imposed, as Germany would have a 
monopoly in this respect. If Poland encounters diffi-
culties in the small port of Danzig in obtaining her 
right of free access to the sea, it may easily be 
foraeen that, in apite of all agreements, powerful 
Germany would soon reduce that access to naught. 
The German counter proposal of June 1919 to the 
Versailles treaty read, in part, that Germany was 
prepared to deolare the ports of Memel, Konigsberg, 
and Danzig aa free ports, and to give Poland far 
reaohing rights in these ports. poland would be then 
a olient of German porta. 
r 
Some nations have no sea coast. Of the 
approximately sixty independent oountries of 
the world, only a very small number have no 
aooess to the sea on aooount of their geographioal 
position. 
In Amerioa there are nineteen countries whioh 
are situated on the Atlantio or the paoifio Ooeana. 
This favorable position of these oountrieS i8 the 
80uroe of their prosperit7. Only Bolivia and 
paraguay of the south American countrie8 laok aea 
coast. In Africa, only Abyssinia, and in ~8ia, 
Afghanistan, -- the bufter state between India, 
PerSia, and Russia Turkestan, have no sea ooast. 
Before the war Europe had three countries 
lacking a sea coast; two of these were of small 
Size and unimportant. The third, Luxemburg, was 
up to 1914 dependent on Germany With regard to 
customs and railway union, and is now united to 
Belgium, using her ports in aocordanoe with ~rtiole 
Forty of the Treaty of Versaillea. 
It seems, then, that a seaport owned in fee 
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poland'. position on the map of oontemporary 
Europe makes poland's foreign policy far more 
decisive than we were aooustomed to reali.a. The 
principal aim of the poliah foreign policy was. on 
tha one hand, to maintain so far as possible 
friendly relations with her t •• mighty neighbors, 
Germany and Russia, and on the other, to make 
poland strong against any attack. It should be 
remembered also, that the Franco-polish Agreement 
concluded January 19, 1921 as wall 8S the Roumanian-
Poliah Alliance are still in eXistence. l 
poland's foreign polioie. were based on the 
simple formula that poland oould rely on no nation 
but herself. Oolonel Beck, poland'S Foreign Minister. 
looked with distrust upon the League of Nations, the 
promises of the Western democraoies and the multi-
lateral security pacta. He had no faith whatever in 
the word of the Nasis. 
And now what is the attitude of Germany toward 
Poland looking to the future? We all know she has 
1. Wolf S., "problems of Mbdern poland,· The 
Contemporarl Review, January 1939, p. 6~ 
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armed at a terrific pace. Prodigious numbers of 
armed men have been springing up where the dragon's 
teeth were sown. Wbat was it all for? There waa 
no doubt that German diplomacy wished to make the 
Peace Treaties everywhere aeem intolerable, and 
that it will apeak more loudly and less legally when 
backed by the full ~. Navl. and Air Forces now 
under construction. Wherever the status quo seema 
vulnerable there the opponenta of Hitler have reason 
to be afraid. l 
As to Poland's relationa with Germanl Since 1919 
it might be aaid that Germanl baa been brought up on 
hiatorl aa it waa taught in the Bismarckian School 
with the idea that an independent poland would be a 
calamitl. The Germans could not believe in the 
permanence of the atate of things that oame into 
being in 1919 on their eastern frontiera. 
Kost of the leaders of the Weimar Republio 
100. 
thought of the new poland as an accident and spoke of her 
as a "temporary" state. One of the main objeotives of 
the policy launched at Rapallo was to make that 
temporarl period 88 brief as possible. on assuming 
the ambas8adorship to the Soviet Union in 1922. 
1. t18kemann, Elilabeth, ~oland and Germany TOd8l," 




Count Von Brockdorff-Rantl&D voiced the opinion 
that "it might be possible to repair at Mosoow 
the damage that had been done at Versailles." 
The Weimar Republic strove to prevent the con-
solidation of Poland in every way possible. It was 
always arOUSing prejudice and opinion against 
Poland abroad and causing as muoh trouble to her 
as it oould at home. That tactio undoubtedly 
worried Poland, but it did not affect her firm 
resolve to stand her ground. In another direction 
it actually was a help to poland. It stimulated her 
business men to take advantage of her outlet to the 
.e., hastening the construction of the port of Gdynia 
by 1930 with French oapital. As the ancient bonda 
between Ger.many and poland were severed, poland's 
economic and politioal independenoe was more and 
more emphasiled. 
In a letter to the CrOwn Prinoe dated September 
7, 1925, stresemann oategorically deolared that 
"reotifioation of the eastern frontiers of the Reich, 
reoovery of the Polish Corridor and of Danzig, and 
alterations in the boundary lines of Upper Silesiaftl 
101. 
r. stre.emann, Gustav, His Diaries, Letters, & papers, 
Vol. II, p. 501 
were outstanding items in the list of Germany's 
territorial demanda. In 1931 Chancellor Bruning 
began applying himself to the execution of that 
program. He sounded out paria, London and Rome 
to aee just how fe.r territorial revision at the 
expense of Poland could be made acceptable to thoae 
capitals. l 
As the fear of Germany inoreased,the Polish 
Alliances weakened and Poland began a searchiI18 
oonsideration of her foreign polioy. 
Chancellor Hitler's regime in Germany waa 
reoeived with marked reserve in poland. The Poles 
could not gueas how he would set about giving 
effect to the first point in his platform whioh 
oalled for the "re-entry of all Germans into the 
bosom of a Greater Germany." 
The advent of Hitler resulted in a new anti-
polish agitation in Danzigo Polish soldiers guarding 
the military base at Westerplatte in Danzig were 
reinforoed on the nights of ~.roh 5 and 6, 1933. 
Hitler saw that Poland would not tolers,te any 
surprise seizure of DanZig, or of any other plaoe, 
1. Bmogorsewski, casimir, "Poland: Free, Peaoeful, 
strong," Poreign Affairs, July 1939 
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and that she would give an energetio answer to 
any German move that affeoted the status quo. He 
began to plaoe a halt on the irritations that had 
isolated Germany and began to try to ore ate a 
healthier atmosphere in German-Polish relations. 
Speaking at Konigsberg on May 2?, 1933, 
Hitler deolared that, "National Sooialism renounoes 
those polioies aiming at a modifioation of natural 
frontiers at the expense of other people." 
Marshal Pilsudski was the first statesman to 
foreoast oorreotly the rising powers of the new 
Germany and the signifioanoe of the Kazi movement. 
He teared that neither Franoe nor Britain oould be 
oounted on to maintain the treaty struoture of 
Versailles by foroe of arms. 
On January 26, 1934, without oonsulting his 
Frenoh ally, Pilsudski negotiated the famous non-
aggression agreement with Hitler. The two oountries 
expressed their determination to "base their mutual 
relations on the prinoiples oontained in the paot 
of paris of August 27, 1928 ••• both governments 
deolared that it was their intention to reaoh 
direot understanding on problems oonoerning their 
mutual relations ••• In no oase, however, shall they 
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have recourse to force in order to aettle suoh 
questiona under dispute." 
The deolaratioa was to remain in foroe during 
a period of ten yeara, but if neither government 
gave notice of its termination 8ix months before 
or after this period of time, it was to continue 
1 in effect. 
By this move Germany made the first dent in 
the ~rench Alliance system, removed the danger of 
attack by poland, secured a Shield from Russian 
aggression, and was able to conoentrate its foroes 
against Austria. The German-polish non-aggression 
paot ended German isolation. 
By this agreement, poland was recognized &8 a 
great power. Having demonstrated its independenoe 
of Franoe, it now beoame an objeot of solicitation 
by many European powera. 
The agreement dispelled the bitternese which had 
existed between poland and the German Republic. The 
German campaign for revision of the Polish frontier. 
the Polish-German tariff war, and the support hitherto 
given by Germany to the minorities within poland came 
1. Wheeler-Bennett, Documenta on International 
...... Affair a , p. 424 
to an end or were considerably moderated. 
Without fear of attack, poland oould now con-
Bolidate its position in the former German provinces; 
momentarily Poland had turned German expansion in 
other directions and thereby gained time for 
rearmament. In view of the unwillingness of Great 
Britain and France to prevent treaty violation by 
Germany, the Polish-German agreement certainly 
served the immediate interest of poland. 
Poland acquiesced in the Nazification of the 
Free City of Danzig, subject to the retention of 
oertain economio rights, and this contributed to 
1 the enormous strengthening of Germany. 
Despite the 193' understanding With German7, 
Poland had no intention of breaking off from ita 
alliance with France. When Germany reoooupied the 
Rhineland in Maroh 1936, poland offered to mobilize 
if France did likewise, but Franoe deolined, thua 
confirming Poland'S diagnosis of the European 
situation. 
When Germany annexed Austria in Karoh 1938, 
Warsaw did nothing. The official view was that 
1. Wertheimer, M. S., "The Bazification of Danzig," 
Fo~elgn Policy Reports, June 1, 1936 
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DenubiaB area. were of seoondary importanoe and 
interest to poland. In the midst of the subsequent 
CzeohosloTak oriais, poland took what amounted to a 
pro-German attitude. 
lor the moment, the Mnnioh Conferenoe and ita 
aftermath seTerely strained relations between 
WarBaw and Berlin. fhe two oountries seemed to 
moTe together when they made an agreement on 
July 1, 1938, diverting German ooal purohases from 
Czeohoslovakia to poland, and the more important 
arrangement of Ootober 17, 1938, by whioh Germany 
agreed to grant a .23,000,000 oredit to poland. l 
While poland's independent foreign policy, 
Whioh reaohed its climax with the Teschen ultimatum, 
alienated the west, warsaw believed more strongly 
than ever that if Czechoslovakia oould not depend 
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on help from France, itB own alliance with the Frenoh 
had become of little importanoe. France had 
acquiesoed in the Polish partitions at the end of 
the eighteenth oentury. Despite its alliance, Franoe 
could do it again. 
NotWithstanding the reduction of Czeohoslovakia 
1. !uell, Raymond LeSlie, ~ eli., p. 346 
as a result of the Munioh Conferenoe, 80me poles 
profeBaed to believe that they oould oount on the 
unilateral promiBea of Hitler not to menaoe their 
own oountry. Others believed that German expansion 
would oontinue in the direction of the southeast 
rather than turn toward the Baltio or the Ukraine. 
In his Sportspalsst speeoh of September 25, 1938, 
Hitler deolared he had informed Chamberlain that 
Germany had no further territorial ambitions in 
Burope. He also deolared that the non-aggression 
pact With poland of 1934 would "bring about lasting 
and continuous pacifioation" a view reiterated in 
J 
his speeoh to the Reichstag of January 30, 1939. 
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lor a people like the Poles, who pride themselves 
on realism, Poland's independenoe must seem to rest 
on a very fragile basis if it depends merely on 
Hitler's self-restraint. !he Third Reioh has not 
postponed its efforts to realise its ambitions, and 
there are no indications that the Nazi regime haa 
abandoned any of Germany's traditional designs, and 
these aspirations oonflict with the poles both in 
the Baltic and the Ukraine. 
From the economic view, poland's position with 
respect to Danzig is fairly strong, should Germ8n7 
annex the Free City, Poland oould divert ita trade 
to Gdy.nia, to the injury of Danzig. Should Hitler 
seize Danzig, it is problematioal whether poland 
oould hold the Corridor on aocount of its short 
width. 
In an interview of January 2', 1938, Foreign 
Minister Beok deolared that, "the foremost principle 
of polish polioy i8 the maintaining of good relatione 
with our neighbors, this is why the Polish Government 
attaches such great importance to its relations with 
Germany and Soviet Russia. 
"The Second prinoiple of our polioy is loyal 
obserTanoe of the allianoe of Poland to France and 
"The ~hird principle is to oppose any decision 
made in matters concerning Poland without co,nsul tilll 
her."l 
Despite the efforts of both Germany and Italy 
to wean Poland away from Franoe after MUnioh, Foreign 
Minister Beok declined to make any comments • 
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. Confronted by Hitler's destruotion of Czeohoslovakia 
in patent violation of the MUnich agreement, poland 
realized that it woul d be the next object of German 
offeneive, unless it showed determination to fight, 
1. New York Times, January 26, 1939 
--
oould strengthen its existing allianoes, and find 
new support. 
In the first week of Maroh, Foreign Minister 
Safenoe of Rumania visited Warsaw and as a result the 
Polish-Rumanian allianoe was strengthened. 
~ritish publio opinion was oonsiderably aroused 
in the meantime, by Hitler's violation of the MUnioh 
agreement and the destruotion of Czeohoslovakia. 
Realizing finally, that unless reai.tanoe was offered 
Nazi Germany would soon dominate Europe and a large 
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part of the world, prime Minister Chamberlain made a 
historio statement in the House of Common., ~roh 31, 
193'. At that time he gave a temporary and unilateral 
assuranoe that "In the event of any aotion whioh olearly 
threatened Polish independence and which the Polish 
government aooordingly oonsidered it vital to resist 
with their national foroeB, HiB ~je8t7'B Government 
would feel themselves bound at onoe to lend the polish 
Government all support in their power. They have given 
the Polish Government an assurance to this effeot. I 
may add that the Frenoh Government have authorized me 
to make it .plain that they stand in the S8me position 
as do His ~jesty's Government."l 
1. Buei; Raymond Leslie. ~ cIt., pp. 351-362 
r 
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When a London newspaper placed a reetrictiTe 
interpretation upon the Chamberlain statement, a 
semi-official source declared that this pledge 
cOTered Danzig and the Corridor if poland thought 
that its independence was threatened there. By 
giTing this pledge Great Britain formally abandonned 
its refusal to accept obligations in Central Europe 
and in effect proclaimed its frontier was not only 
on the Rhine but on the Vistula. 
During the next week Foreign Minister Beok paid 
a Tisit to London, and Britain and Poland agreed to 
enter into a permanent and reoiprooal understanding 
to replaoe the assurance given by Chamberlain on 
March 31, 1939. 
Pending oompletion of the permanent agreement, 
Colonel Beck, Poland's Foreign Minister, deolared 
that Poland would oonsider itself under obligations 
to render assistance to Britain under the s&me 
oonditions 8S Britain would be obligated to render 
aSSistance to poland. 
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This mutual aSSistance pact applied to "any threat, 
1 direot or indireot, to the independ.enoe of either." 
Reports beoame numerous that nanaig would be 
I. New York Times, April as, lO!' 
--=---
r 
annexed by Germany on Hitler's birthday, April 20, 
before the Polish-British guarantee had been finished • 
• new faotor disrupted these plans, if they existed. 
for on April 15, president Roosevelt addressed hi8 
dramatio appeal to Hitler and MUssolini aSking a ten 
year pledge of non-aggression toward thir$7 state •• 
and proposing a peaoe conference. 
Although the message did not specifioally 
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mention Danzig, Roosevelt probably saved the 'ree City 
from German occupation. and thereby averted momentarily 
at least, a great war. Hitler spent the next two 
weeks preparing a reply to the Roosevelt plea. In 
" an addresa to the Reichstag on April 28, the fuhrer 
not only rejected the preSident's offer for a multi-
lateral agreement, but denounoed the German-polish 
non-aggression pact of January 1934. 
He added, oontrary to previous statements. that 
the treaty provisions giving poland a corridor to the 
se. prevented for "all time the establishment of an 
understanding between poland and Germany." 
As a result of abrogation of the 1934 pact, 
relations between Germany and poland became very tense, 
and the Nazis reiterated that Danzig must be returne' 
to the Reioh. 
r 
i 
On March 21, 1939, Hitler asked to build a 
highwa7 -- reported to be fifteen miles in width --
as well as a railroad aoross the so-oalled Corridor 
under German extraterritorial jurisdiotion. In 
return Hitler would reoognize polish eoonomio right. 
in Danzig, inoluding the right to a free harbor. 
112. 
aooept the present boundaries between the two countrie •• 
extend the non-aggression pact for twenty-five years. 
Germany also demanded in the same note the return 
of Danzig as a "free oity in the frame work of the 
German Reich." 1 
Poland could not possibly acoept these terms, 
beoause the oontrol of the V1stula River and poland's 
outlet to the sea would have been plaoed at the 
oomplete mercy of Germany. Onoe Germany had fortified 
Dansig, it could easily dominate Gdynia and the 
Corridor. The position of Poland would be partioularly 
vulnerable if Germany should build • fifteen mile 
wide road aoross Pomorle, polioed by German soldiers. 
It would not be long before Germany entrenohed at 
the mouth. of.the Vistula River would dominate poland 
proper and eventually the whole of Eastern Europe 
extending to the Blaok Sea. As Frederiok II said in 
1. Hitler, Adolph, Retohsts! speech of, AprIl 29, 1939 
1'72, ~oever possesses the mouth of the Vistula 
and the city of Danzig will be more the master thaD 
the king who rules there. nl 
On September first. nineteen hundred and 
thirt7-nine, Germany's arm, began an invasion of 
poland and on September third, Britain and 'ranee 
declared war on Germany. 
On September seventeenth, Russia invaded 
Poland. 
On September twenty-ninth. Russia and Germany 
eigned an agreement to partition poland. 2 By this 
agreement Germany acquired about three fifths of 
poland and Russia took the remainder of the country. 
Germany's part was the western section of poland, 
RU8sia's holding8 lay to the east, bordering on 
Russia. 
t. Wolfe, Henry C., "the Ghoet of the Corridor," 
lI'ew Republic, 92:240, 1937 






Viewing the faota impartially. 8a the 
historian does, we oome to the oonolusion that 
the land area of the Polish Corridor in the 
light of history belonged to poland, though by 
no great margine Rehearsing the facta of history • 
• e find that there was 8 piece of'land, small in 
Size and of irregular shape, bordering on the 
Bal tic Sea, and of little intrinsic value, which 
was once nominally and actualiy Polish. Then the 
Germans took it by foroe and held it for a hundred 
an~ fifty years. The Peaoe Conferenoe of paria 
returned it to poland, with Germany protesting, 
and thereby separated East Prussia from Germany 
Droper. This was the "Corridor." The Corridor 
gaTe Poland a sea ooast and control of both aide. 
of the Vistula RiTer to its mouth where the 'ree 
City of Danzig was Situated. 
We are foroed to conclude then, that in the 
light of history. the Corridor belonged to poland. 
~rom the ethnioal standpoint the population 
of the Corridor was Polish by a very small majority-
The inhabitants of the Northern districts of 
r 
pomorse, who are known as oashubes, are also 
of Polish origin. !hey apeak a polish dialeci. 
In spite of policies of Germanization of this 
section by means of German colonists, the people 
bave preserved their polish character intact. 
Prom 18'1 to 1918, that is, throughout the 
duration of the German Empire, the Pomeranian 
districts were contlnuously represented in ihe 
German parliament by polish deputles and on no 
occasion was a German elected in flfteen eleotions. l 
Ethnioally, then, we mnst conclude that the 
Oorridor was polish. 
finally, examination of the economio aspect 
of the problem convinces us that this territory 
is undoubtedly a part of the Polish economic unit 
rather than of the German; that it i8 needed &8 
an outlet muoh more by the pole8 than by the 
Germans; that much more inconvenience would be 
suffered by the poles than by the Germans living 
in East Prussia; that it would be a very great 
economic injury not to permit the Poles to have 
this outlet to the Bea from their country under 
their own oontrol. 
I. Bueil, Raymond LeSlie, ~ cit., p. 369 
115. 
All of these facts le8d us to but one 
conclu8ion, and that i8 that poland should have 
the ~Cor.ridor.ft 70r historical. ethnical and 
eoonomic reasons, we believe that the paris Peaoe 
Conference made proper dispo8ition of the land of 
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